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ABSTRACT

The Interdependent Morality Directive: An Extension o f the Animal Rights
and Environmental Ethics Debate offers a foundation that seeks to reconcile the
contending arguments from the animal rights and the environmental ethics
schools of thought. By constantly emphasizing the interdependency of all
members of the biosphere, the Interdependent Morality Directive offers a unique
perspective concerning how humans can learn to interact with the Earth’s varied
and diverse life forms. First, this thesis presents an analysis of two opposing
camps: (1) the environmentalist argument as represented by Aldo Leopold’s A
Sand County Almanac (the land ethic) and Paul Taylor’s Respect For Nature
and (2) the animal rights argument of Tom Regan in his book The Case for
Animal Rights. Next, the point of conflict between these two groups is examined
showing how the environmentalist’s concern for the land is in direct conflict with
the animal rightist’s focus on non-human animals. Finally, the Interdependent
Morality Directive is presented. David Hume’s concept of sympathy is referenced
as a principle basis for this argument. The Interdependent Morality Directive
seeks to extend both the animal rights and environmental theories, claiming that
by adopting an all-members-of-the-biosphere-are-interdependent philosophy,
each school of thought can create more efficient policy proposals using Richard
Taylor’s "Interpretive “ approach to policy analysis.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTIO N
The point of conflict between animal rightists on one hand and
environmentalists on the other is not a new policy question. Many proposals
have been offered attempting to unify or in some way merge the philosophies of
animal rightists and environmentalists. This thesis is not another attempt to solve
the debate between the aforementioned schools of thought. Instead, it is the
ultimate goal of this thesis to present a foundation from which a practical policy
implementation plan may emerge, so as to enable the two groups to cooperate
from a unified, stronger coalition. The need for an extension of each group’s
philosophies is clear. As stated by both sides of the animal rights/ environmental
ethics debate:
Conflicts will certainly arise among all the foci of the human/animal/
environmental triangle, but well-meaning people can muddle through the
moral wilderness, balancing and compromising the competing interests and
incommensurable values. Only by combining the environmentalist and
animal rights perspective can we take account of the full range of moral
considerations which ought to guide our interactions with the nonhuman
world (Warren, 113).
It is from this perspective this thesis is written.
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POINTS OF CO NFLIC T

The Point of Conflict - The Argument for Animal Rights vs.
The Argument for Environmental Protection

The Case for Animal Rights by Tom Regan is a powerful book presenting
an argument which claims that most non-human mammals should share the
same moral and legal standing that is assigned to human animals.
The concept of “subject-of-a-life" is a central notion in Regan’s argument.
This concept encompasses those individuals who have beliefs and desires, an
emotional life, and a psychophysical identity over time, that is that their
experience is psychologically continuous and associated with the same body.
Regan claims that this definition applies most clearly to normal adult mammals.
Subjects-of-a-life can be either moral agents or moral patients. Moral patients
are those individuals who are not morally accountable for their actions (for
example, human infants, the mentally deranged, and most other mammals).
Moral agents are autonomous individuals (for example normal, healthy adult
human beings) who can be held morally accountable for the acts they perform or
fail to perform. Regan argues that both moral agents and moral patients have
inherent valued and they have it equally, claiming that moral agents and moral
patients have such a value simply because they exist. According to Regan,
those who have inherent value are entitled to respectful treatment because they

1 Inherent value refers to the value of an individual as a subject-of-a-life. This value is independent of the
value of that individual for others and also is independent of the value of that individual’s experiences, such
as how cultivated its tastes are.
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are not merely things, like rocks or trees. Thus, Regan rules out hunting and
trapping as well as most forms of wildlife management such as the promotion of
maximum sustainable yield of game or animals for sport hunting. For Regan
members of an endangered species are no more valuable than members of any
other non-endangered species. Since all animals (mostly mammals) deserve
respectful treatment, it is mainly human practices which need management.
The second central point of Regan's argument is his notion of the rights
view. Specifically, this view states:
No one, whether human or animal, is ever to be treated as if she
were a mere receptacle, or as if her value were reducible to her
possible utility to others. W e are, that is, never to harm the individual
merely on the grounds that such harm will or just might produce ‘the
best’ aggregate consequences. To do so is to violate the rights of the
individual. That is why harm done to animals in pursuit of scientific
purposes is wrong. The benefits derived are real enough; but some
gains are ill gotten, and all gains are ill-gotten when secured unjustly
(Regan, Tom, The Case for Animal Rights, LA, CA.: University of
California Press, 1983, 393)2.

Specifically, Regan seeks not only to end unnecessary suffering but all
suffering of non-human mammals imposed by all humans. Regan is against the
view that animals exist only for our purposes, as evidenced by the following
claim: “ The fundamental wrong is the system that allows us to view animals as
our resources, here for us to be eaten, surgically manipulated, or exploited for
sport or money” (Regan, 150).
Regan is arguing for an abrupt change in how human animals view

2 All subsequent references to this work will be cited parenthetically.
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and treat non-human animals. Non -human animals are not to be used as
subjects for a higher purpose; since they are beings with a value independent of
their usefulness to others and as such can never be treated as means to the
ends of others. Consequently, non-human animals are not to be confined to
cages, zoos, circuses, or any other environment that is not in accordance with
their natural habitat. In short, animal rightists do not seek larger cages for non
human animals, nor more comfortable cages, but rather empty cages.
For the comparative purposes of this segment of the thesis, the
environmentalist argument is best represented by the works of Aldo Leopold and
Paul Taylor. Leopold is universally recognized as the father of most recent
environmental ethics and his “land ethic" is a cornerstone to many environmental
philosophies. Paul Taylor’s book Respect for Nature offers a unique extension of
Leopold’s land ethic. Both Taylor’s and Leopold’s work are crucial for showing
the point of conflict between the animal rightists and environmentalists.
Leopold argues that a basic lack of human regard for the land itself lies at
the heart of most natural resource and agricultural problems. He argues
convincingly that the biotic world and natural environment themselves have
intrinsic value. Rather than dominating and exploiting the natural world, Leopold
believes that humans should see themselves as members of the biotic
community instead of individuals outside the biotic community.
Leopold’s most famous contribution to the environmentalist ethic is what
he termed “the land ethic”3. This “land ethic” embodies the first clear definition of
3 Leopold’s essay, The L an d Ethic is one of the final sections in his book A S a n d County Almanac. It is
considered by m any philosophers to be the basic foundation of all environm ental ethical theories.
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human responsibility to the natural environment. The heart of this ethic can be
summarized as follows : “A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity,
stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise”
(Leopold, Aldo, A Sand County Almanac, New York, Viking Press, 1971, 34)4. 5
For Leopold the idea of a holistic, interdependent planet is of paramount
importance:
The land ethic enlarges the boundaries of the community to
include soil, waters, plants and animals or collectively the land. It
demands that each question of man’s relationship to his
environment be studied in terms of what was ethically and
esthetically right, as well as economically expedient (Nash,
Roderick. Wilderness and the American Mind, Third Edition, New
Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1982, 197)6 .

Leopold is arguing for an ecological conscience which acknowledges that the
land has value; for Leopold states, “ the earth as a whole, including its
atmosphere, its waters and its soil and rocks is essential to the existence of [all]
communities” (Leopold, 36). Since all communities share in their dependence on
the earth per-se, the earth should be valued both as an instrumental part of life
itself.
Paul Taylor’s book Respect for Nature offers an extension of Leopold’s
land ethic. Taylor develops the view that human beings are members of the
earth’s living community but are not inherently superior to other living things and
are therefore not entitled to special considerations. Each organism, in whatever
4 All subsequent references to this w ork will be cited parenthetically.
5 T h e 'good' of the biotic com m unity is the ultim ate m easu re of the m oral value, the rightness or
wrongness, of actions.
6 All subsequent references to this w ork will be cited parenthetically.
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form, is what he refers to as a “teleological center of life" 7 .
Unlike Leopold, Taylor presents a very specific framework which lays out
how humans should act in their dealings with nature. Taylor argues that unless
humans are given concise and explicit boundaries, human needs will take
priority. Accordingly, Taylor provides the following guidelines:
There are four duties or rules to obey when dealing with nature,
the fundamental duty being nonmaleficence8 . The other three
rules are those [a] requiring restitution of harm done (restitutive
justice), [b] refraining from interfering in the natural world
(noninterference) and [c] faithfulness to the trust placed in human
beings by wild animals (fidelity)
(Taylor, 2 4 5 )9

So by applying these four rules of conduct toward nature, humans are
virtually assured of doing no more than minimal harm when dealing with nature.
To guarantee that these four rules of conduct are followed, Taylor
provides four guidelines for the legitimate resolution of conflicting claims
between the duties of human ethics and those of environmental ethics. These
are as follows: (1) self-defense, (2) proportionality, (3) minimum harm,
(4) distributive justice, and (5) restitutive ju s tic e ^ . In order to implement these
guidelines, Taylor formulates a distinction between basic and nonbasic interests:
Basic interests are what rational and factually enlightened
people would value as an essential part of their very existence as
persons. They are what people need if they are going to pursue
those goals and purposes that make life meaningful and
7 'Teleological center o f life’ refers to a unique individual pursuing its own good in its own w ay.
8 T o do no harm
9 T aylo r does not arg u e that anim als and plants have m oral rights in the s a m e sense that hum ans do but
rather th a t the attitude o f respect for nature requires m oral agents to live in accord with the four duties
tow ard nature.
19 Each of these guidelines will be specifically discussed in the following section.
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worthwhile. Thus for human persons their basic interests are those
interests which, when morally legitimate, they have a right to have
fulfilled. These conditions include subsistence and security (the
“right to life”), autonomy, and liberty. In contrast, nonbasic interests
are the particular ends we consider worth seeking and the means
we consider best for achieving them that make up our individual
value systems. The nonbasic interests of humans vary from person
to person, while their basic interests are common to all
(Taylor, 240).
So, when wild animals and plants are not harmful to human beings, the
basic interests of wild animals and plants override the nonbasic interests of
human beings. If the basic interests of both humans and nonhumans are
involved, conflicts would need to be decided according to distributive justice.11
Such an ethic would only come into play, however, if self-defense were not an
issue. Cases of self-defense would justify the interest’s of humans over
nonhuman. This concept will be explained further in Chapter 3.
The theories of Aldo Leopold and Paul Taylor focus on the importance of
being sensitive to the needs of the environment. The main focus is on the
inherent worth of the land itself, as well as the necessity to adopt an attitude of
respect for nature because we, as humans, are an intrinsic part of nature.
Taylor and Leopold are set against Regan because animal rightists are
primarily concerned with the interests of non-human animals (specifically
mammals) while those who subscribe to an environmental ethic focus on the
stability and diversity of ecosystems themselves. Leopold’s “land ethic", for
example, places considerably more emphasis on maintaining the complex

11 T h a t is, species-im partial fairness w here each species' interests would be considered equally.
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structure of “the land” and its proper functioning as an energy unit than on any
individual members and material components of the ecosystem. And while
Taylor’s theory is more individualistic than Leopold’s, it does not go quite far
enough. Taylor concedes that it is possible for plants, trees and animals to be
accorded value and rights under his theory but Taylor himself does not offer any
specific arguments to support such an ethic. Thus, the first major difference is
that Regan is individualistic whereas Taylor and Leopold are holistic.
Tom Regan considers holistic views such as Leopold’s and Taylor’s to be
a form of "environmental fascism” since the individual has no value in itself. On
Regan’s reading, the land ethic only assigns value relative to the membership in
a biotic community. Regan argues that if human beings show proper respect for
the rights of the individuals who make up the biotic community, the biotic
community itself will be preserved while retaining intrinsic value for some
members, specifically mammals.
The point of conflict, therefore, is unambiguous: environmentalists argue
that the ecosystems should be the foremost consideration. The interests of
individual living creatures are secondary. Animal rightists, by comparison, argue
just the opposite: they say that we must consider the individual, moral agents or
patients (mammals), first and then the concerns of the community/environment
will more or less be protected in turn, indirectly.

CHAPTER 2

IN DEFENSE OF ANIMAL RIGHTS

A Critical Analysis o f the Animal Rights Position

The animals humans eat, use in science, hunt, trap, and exploit
in a variety of ways, have a life of their own that is of importance to
them apart from their utility to us. They are not only in the world,
they are aware of it. W hat happens to them matters to them. Each
has a life that fares better or worse for the one whose life it is.
(Regan, 12)

In this quotation, Tom Regan, the founder of the anim al^ rights
movement, offers a theoretical grounding for his claim that non-human animals
should be granted moral standing. Regan’s use of the words “exploit in a variety
of ways” in the above quotation is not to be taken lightly. In the following pages I
want to examine some of the many examples of human exploitation of non
human animals.
First, we examine the production of veal. Veal is only marketable if its
flesh is very tender. So, if the calf were left to grow up outside, its playful nature
would lead it to romp around the fields, thereby developing muscles, which
would make its flesh tough. To avoid this, the veal producer takes his calf
straight from an auction ring to a confinement unit, which is a wooden stall 1

12 In this chapter o f the thesis, unless otherw ise indicated, the word anim al will refer to m am m alian
anim als only.
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foot 10 inches wide and 4 feet 6 inches long. The calves will be tethered by a
chain around the neck to prevent them turning around in their stalls. No straw or
other bedding is allowed, since the calf may eat it which would then spoil the
taste of its flesh. Here the calves will live for the next thirteen to fifteen weeks,
leaving their stalls only to be taken out to slaughter. They are fed a totally liquid
diet. It is evident that these creatures lead short, miserable lives for absolutely
no other reason than to please the palate of human animals. Clearly they are
being treated as means for human’s ends, and not very lofty ends at that.
Another area of extreme exploitation is found within the scientific
community. Painful experiments are performed in the field of psychology, for
example, involving experiments on the brain of cats or other small nonhuman
mammals. This includes cutting, coagulating and removing brain tissue,
stimulating the brain by electrical and chemical means. This often occurs without
the use of any anesthesia whatsoever.
Monkeys are often used in scientific research. In one case study, female
monkeys are used to ascertain the parental behavior patterns of female
monkeys reared in isolation. These monkeys were impregnated. W hen the
babies were born, some females simply ignored the infants, failing to cuddle the
crying baby to the breast as normal monkeys do when they hear their baby cry.
The other pattern observed was markedly different as well as violent:
One of their favorite tricks was to crush the infant’s skull with
their teeth. But the really sickening behavior pattern was that of
smashing the infant’s face to the floor, then rubbing it back and
forth (Singer, Peter, Animal Liberation, NY, NY, Avon ,1975, 43)13 .
13 All subsequent references to this w ork will be cited parenthetically.
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In this case, the value of these monkeys is limited to its use as a scientific
research tool and nothing more. It is being treated as a thing, a means for
human’s ends.
Such abominable practices are routine and are considered legitimate and
standard methods for obtaining new data. The pain and anguish the monkey
endures is trivial to the scientific community. These examples of human being’s
exploitation of mammals are what Regan fervently argues against. He argues
that all mammals ought to be considered with the same respect regardless of the
species of a particular mammal.
I want to turn to an analysis of Regan’s argument for animal rights. I will
focus on several key claims and evaluate those claims as they pertain to his
argument, in an attempt to ascertain the plausibility and soundness of his
argument.

Tom Regan's Argument for Animal Rights: A Condensed Analysis

W e begin with an examination of the central idea of Regan’s argument,
his notion of “subject-of-a-life":
To be the subject-of-a-life, in the sense in which this expression
will be used, involves more than merely being alive and more than
merely being conscious...[Individuals are subject-of-a-life if they
have beliefs and desires; perception, memory, and a sense of the
future; an emotional life together with feelings of pleasure and
pain; preference and welfare-interests; the ability to initiate action
in pursuit of their desires and goals; a psychophysical identity over
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tirneH; and an individual welfare in the sense that their experiential
life fares well or ill for them, logically and independently of their
being the object of anyone else’s interests. Those who satisfy the
subject-of-a-life criterion themselves have a distinctive kind of
value - an inherent value - and are not to be viewed or treated as
mere receptacles (Regan, 35).

Subjects-of-a-life have some sense of the past and an anticipation of the
future, as well as a sufficiently reflective consciousness that they are
meaningfully able to communicate, in some way, that their life is better or worse
for them as subjects-of-a-life.
A key term in the above passage, inherent value, is one of primary
significance to Regan’s entire argument. Inherent value refers to the value of an
individual as a subject-of-a-life and it is possessed by all individuals who are
subjects-of-a-life. Inherent value is independent of the instrumental value of the
individual for others and is also independent of the value of that individual’s
experiences, such as how much pleasure that individual has or how cultivated its
tastes are. Inherent value, therefore, is a constant for all subjects-of-a-life. The
worth of such an individual is fixed and eternal. So Regan is arguing that being a
subject-of-a-life is a sufficient condition for an individual having inherent value.
Next, Regan classifies subjects-of-a-life into two categories: moral agents
or moral patients:
Moral agents are individuals who have a variety of sophisticated
abilities, including in particular the ability to bring impartial moral
principles to bear on the determination of what morally ought to be
done. Thus, moral agents are accountable for what acts they
perform or fail to perform. Furthermore, moral agents are ends in
themselves. They each have, in their own right, independent value,
14 T hat is that their experience is psychologically continuous and associated with the sam e body.
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or worth quite apart from how useful they happen to be to others.
Normal adult human beings are the paradigm individuals believed
to be moral agents. Moral patients, in contrast, lack the
prerequisites that would enable them to control their own behavior
in ways that would make them morally accountable for what they
do. A moral patient lacks the ability to do what is right and what is
wrong. Also, moral patients fail to be ends in themselves and are
nonrational. Human infants, young children and the mentally
deranged or enfeebled of all ages are paradigm cases of human
moral patients. (Regan, 243)

So moral agents can be held morally accountable for acts they perform or
fail to perform, whereas moral patients cannot. Moral patients are unable to
formulate or act upon moral principles, although they are conscious, sentient,
and have a psychophysical identity over time.
Regan’s subject-of-a-life criterion is the philosophical basis for his entire
animal rights argument. Regan states: “The subject-of-a-life criterion can be
defended as citing a relevant similarity between moral agents and patients, one
that makes the attribution of equal inherent value to them both intelligible and
non arbitrary" (Regan, 245). Inherent value is possessed by all individuals who
are subjects-of-a-life, which includes both moral agents and moral patients.
Thus, although a moral patient may be more muscular or more beautiful than
another moral agent or patient, these differences are irrelevant to the inherent
worth of any moral patient or agent. Moral patients have inherent value equal to
that of moral agents and, therefore, have equal rights to respectful treatment. As
Regan notes, “One either is a subject-of-a-life or one is not. All those who are,
are so equally" (Regan, 244).
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Regan’s entire argument for animal rights is held together by one final
principle: the respect principle:
If individuals have equal inherent value, then any principle
which declares what treatment is due them as a matter of justice
must take their equal inherent value into account. The following
principle (the respect principle) does this We are to treat those
individuals who have inherent value in ways that respect their
inherent value. This principle does not apply only to how we are to
treat some individuals having inherent value. It enjoins us to treat
all those individuals having inherent value, and thus it requires
respectful treatment of all who satisfy the subject-of-a-life criterion.
W hether they are moral agents or patients, we must treat them in
ways that respect their equal inherent value. Thus, it is not an act
of kindness to treat animals respectfully. It is an act of justice [in
accordance with the respect principle]. It is not the “sentimental
interests” of moral agents that grounds our duties of justice to
children, the retarded, the senile, or other moral patients, including
animals. It is respect for their inherent value (Regan, 248).

It follows that Regan argues for the rights of all subjects-of-a-life. Regan’s
case for animal rights is based on: (1) the subject-of-a-life criterion; (2) the
notion of the equality of inherent value; and (3) the respect principle. Regan
claims that these three basic principles provide the underpinning for his entire
argument for animal rights.

Assessing R egan’s Position

In examining Regan’s position, it is essential to study the usage of key
terms and phrases within the animal rights argument. One primary term Regan
utilizes in his argument is found in his definition of subject-of-a-life:
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consciousness. The term consciousness, as used by Regan, has basically the
same meaning for animals as it does for humans; consciousness refers to the
state of having a mental life, that is a life that is at least aware of itself as
existing and occupying a space in the world.
In defining consciousness, Regan argues that several important reasons
exist that would explain why an animal qualifies as possessing consciousness.
Taken together these “reasons” also define how Regan uses the terms
"consciousness". I will examine four of these reasons which, when taken
together, provide an important part of what Regan refers to as the Cumulative
Argument for Animal Consciousness.

Reason 1: The attribution o f consciousness to certain animals is
part of the common sense view o f the world; attempts to discredit
this belief, such as Descartes’s, if Descartes' attempt is taken as
illustrative, have proven to lack adequate justification (Regan, 28).

Descartes’ view is that animals have no consciousness whatsoever.
Animals are “thoughtless brutes," automata, machines. Despite appearances to
the contrary, they are not aware of anything, neither sights nor sounds, smells
nor tastes, heat nor cold. They do not experience hunger or thirst, fear or rage,
pleasure or pain. Animals are, Descartes observes at one point, like clocks; they
are able to do some things better than we can, just as a clock can keep better
time; but like a clock, animals are not conscious. As Descartes states, in regards
to animal consciousness, “It is nature which acts on them [animals] according to
the disposition of their organs, just as a clock, which is only composed of wheels
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and weights, is able to measure the time more accurately than we can with all
our wisdom” (Descartes, Discourse on Method in Philosophical Works of
Descartes, trans. E.S.Haldane and G.R.T. Ross, London, Cambridge University
Press, 62).
In refuting Descartes, Regan focuses on several aspects of Descartes’
argument. First, Regan emphasizes the fact that Descartes is a dualist in that he
views reality as consisting of only two things : (1) minds and (2) bodies.
Descartes regards minds as having no physical properties and thus they have
no location in space. In contrast, bodies have physical properties. Bodies are
unconscious in the sense that they completely lack thought; they are non mind.
A rock lacks consciousness (thought) just as much as a tree, a dog’s body, or a
human body. All are equally unconscious. Human bodies, thus, do not differ
essentially from any other kind of body. W here they do differ is that they are
associated with human minds. All other bodies, according to Descartes, lack a
mind with which they are associated; and the reason why we feel pain, whereas
dogs feel none, according to Descartes, is not because our bodies are in any
essential way different from a dog’s; it is because our bodies are; whereas a
dog’s is not, associated with a non-bodily, immaterial mind.
Now in criticizing Descartes’ position Regan argues that there is a major
problem with Descartes’ dualism because it provides no satisfactory explanation
concerning how this so-called union of the mind and body could possibly come
about. As an example, Regan argues that physical processes may bring about
physical changes, but how a physical process can bring about changes in
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something that is not physical is less clear-cut, although, according to Descartes
theory, that is just what happens when a tack’s intrusion into my foot causes a
sensation of pain. Regan concludes by noting that the question is not how this
occurs but how can such an instance ever occur. By insisting, as he does, that
the mind is immaterial and the body material, Descartes is unable to explain how
what evidently does occur can occur. There is, within this theory, no plausible,
intelligible way of explaining the possibility of such a relationship.
As Regan states:
There is a lesson to be learned from Descartes’ downfall. It is
that viewing the mind as an “immaterial something,” as a soul, is
certain to land us in trouble. For unless we are prepared to argue
that everything is immaterial, the problem of interaction [between
mind and body] will [always] arise (Regan, 24).

So Descartes’ dualism is not a basis for arguing that non human animals
feel no pain because they have no mind that can experience pain because such
an argument is unsubstantiated. There is physical pain that is real, yet
Descartes would have us believe that it cannot be real for non-humans because
only humans possess consciousness. Yet there is probably pain experienced by
a dog when it is kicked or hit on the snout, as evidenced by its yelps. How would
Descartes’ explain this? He cannot and that is the problem with his dualism.
Reason 2 : The attribution of consciousness to certain animals is in
harmony with the ordinary use o f language; attempts to reform or
replace this way of speaking, as the experiment of contemporary
psychologist D. 0 . Hebb and his associates illustrates, have proven
to lack adequate justification (Regan, 28).

18
According to Regan, ordinary language is not strained by describing
animals in a way that implies that they have a mental life. “Everyone who is
conversant in, say, English, understands perfectly well what is mean to say that
Fido is hungry, or that a mother lion is annoyed by her overly playful cub”
(Regan, 25). In short, there is no reason to modify the way in which humans
speak about non-human animals. This concept is strengthened with the
experiments done by D.O. Hebb:

W hat the experience of Hebb and his colleagues points to is that
there is nothing to be gained, and a good deal to be lost, if, in
place of the mentalistic language we ordinarily use in talking about
many animals, we institute a different, supposedly objective,
nonmentalistic vocabulary (Regan, 26).

The experiments done by Hebb involved several adult chimpanzees where the
experimenters attempted to avoid, as Hebb put it, “anthropomorphic
descriptions in the study of temperament" (D.O. Hebb, “Emotion in Man and
Animal”, Psychological Review, 1946, 53 : 88)15 . Hebb reports the following:
A formal experiment was set up to provide records of the actual
behavior of adult chimpanzees, and from these records to get an
objective statement of the differences from animal to animal. The
results were useless. All that resulted was an endless series of
specific acts where no meaning could be found (Hebb, 88).

Thus, Hebb’s experiments support the notion that to speak or think about
certain animals in terms of having a consciousness is perfectly acceptable as
well as advantageous. To do otherwise would only result in serious confusion.

15 All subsequent references to this w ork will be cited parenthetically.
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When the anthropomorphic descriptions were allowed, one could quickly and
easily describe the behavior of particular animals.

Reason 3 - The behavior exhibited by animals is consistent with
viewing them as conscious.

In support of this , Regan provides the following argument:
[If] mice behaved at random, [in] unpredictable ways when
presented with some cheese after having gone without food for a
day or so, [some humans] would have to wonder whether these
animals weren’t unruly machines (as Descartes argues) after all. In
fact, however, animal behavior is not random, is not in principle
unpredictable. For example, the mice will eat the cheese, as one
would naturally expect of conscious creatures, or if they do not,
their unexpected behavior would be due to some untoward
condition (e.g. a lack of sensory powers). So, while it is true that
how animals behave does not by itself prove that they have a
mental life, their behavior does provide a reason for viewing them
this way (Regan, 27).

So, the behavior of mice suggests that they have an awareness or
consciousness as to their surroundings.
There are numerous other examples that would support the idea that non
human animals are conscious. Dogs and cats, for example, behave in ways that
strongly suggest consciousness. A dog’s unique reaction to its master’s
homecoming; a cat’s desire to hunt for birds and bring the bird back to its master
as a sign of affection. Furthermore, dogs have been shown to understand over
100 words of the English language, reacting differently to even subtle
differences in the pronunciation of words spoken by humans.
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Even wild animals, such as monkeys, elephants, and dolphins exhibit
behavior supporting the notion of consciousness. Elephants, for instance, often
return to the site of deceased ancestors, carefully marking the area and
protecting it from intruders. Dolphins have exhibited behavior suggesting that
they can understand the English language by specifically responding, in their
own way, to a variety of questions posed by humans. Monkeys have been taught
complex sign language allowing them to speak to humans, as well as other
monkeys. All these examples strongly suggest that non-human animals are, in
fact, conscious members of the biosphere, and as such possess an intrinsic
value.
Reason 4 : An evolutionary understanding of consciousness
provides a theoretical basis for attributing awareness to animals
other than human beings.

In support of this premise, Regan claims that the scientific concept of
evolution firmly denies that humans have a unique nature; on the contrary, it
supports a complex fusion between less developed forms of life with more
advanced life forms. Furthermore, Regan states:
More particularly, those who would view humans as the only
conscious beings could not adequately ground this belief in
considerations about human biology, physiology, and anatomy,
since there is nothing in these aspects of human nature that is
both relevant to our being conscious and uniquely human (Regan,
27, emphasis added).

Hence, Regan argues that the theory of evolution itself provides a basis from
which to argue that beings other than humans are conscious.
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According to Regan, the preceding argument, which he refers to as the
Cumulative Argument, does not constitute a strict proof of animal awareness,
and it is unclear what shape such a proof could take, yet it does provide a set of
relevant reasons for attributing consciousness to certain animals. In other words,
Regan’s Cumulative Argument offers strong reasons, but not absolute reasons
as to the issue of whether or not non-human animals possess consciousness.
Regan argues, therefore, that although consciousness is a complex attribute, it
can be logically extended to other animals besides humans.
Closely related to the term consciousness is a second important phrase
used by Regan in his definition of subject-of-a-life: beliefs and desires. Regan
claims that the same arguments used to defend the claim that animals are
conscious could be used to defend the claim that they have beliefs and desires.
To define this phrase, Regan uses the belief-desire theory of Stephen
Stich of Rutgers University. Basically the belief-desire theory postulates two
different sorts of functional states: beliefs and desires. Desires, Stich argues,
typically arise as a result of deprivation. An organism deprived of food, water, or
sexual release, will acquire a desire for food, water or sexual release. Desires
can, in addition, be generated by the interaction of beliefs with other desires.
Thus, for example, if a dog wants something to eat and if it believes there is a
meaty bone in the next room, it may well acquire a desire to go to the next room.
Stich goes on to point out that desires can be linked to beliefs because,
like desires, beliefs have a variety of causes, with the two most powerful ones
being perception and inference. For example, if a canine sees that its master put
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a meaty bone in its dish, then the dog may form the belief that there is a meaty
bone in the dish. It will also, no doubt, form a variety of further beliefs,
some enduring and some ephemeral, as a result of observing its master’s
activity. So, by using the terms beliefs and desires in this way, Regan adds
credibility to his definition of subject-of-a-life. He sets the boundaries for what is
and isn’t consciousness. All beings who possess consciousness are subjects-ofa-life:
Perception, memory, desire, self-consciousness, intention and a
sense of the future are among the leading attributes of the mental
life of normal mammalian animals. Add to this the not unimportant
categories of emotion (e.g. fear and hatred) and sentience and we
approach a fair rendering of the mental life of these animals.
(Regan, 81).

Regan sets the boundaries, therefore, for his use of the term consciousness and
the terms belief and desires. Next, I will begin an evaluation of Regan’s
argument by assessing his claims about which animals are conscious are which
are not. This will show us a major flaw in Regan's case for animal rights.

Which Life Forms Count? Evaluating Regan's Position in Terms of Taylor’s and
Leopold’s Ethical Theory

On the basis of the considerations we have just discussed Regan makes
the following claim : “Not all living things are subjects-of-a-life; thus not all living
things are to be viewed as having the same moral status” (Regan, 245). In other
words, there are life forms that are neither moral patients nor moral agents.
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Plants and trees, for example, are neither; they will, therefore, find no safe
haven within Regan’s arguments for animal rights. It is from this aspect of
Regan’s argument that I will begin an evaluation of his animal rights position.
Regan’s criterion for subjects-of-a-life is a good place to begin; since this
is where we find the line of demarcation between those who are and are not
subjects-of-a-life having intrinsic value.
It is important to note here that Regan’s view is an example of an ethic
which places exclusive moral value on individuals. Regan affirms that only
individuals can be meaningfully said to have moral value in and of themselves.
For Regan, neither species nor ecosystems embody moral value. Individuals are
the paradigmatic holders of value, since it is individuals who are conscious, who
feel and make decisions, who care about what happens to them and who are
subjects-of-a-life.
Regan’s ethic is also anti-utilitarian. The concept of sacrificing a few
individuals so that a majority could benefit would probably be dubbed a form of
holistic fascism by Regan. For Regan, the needs of the many will usually never
outweigh the needs of the few, since Regan’s argument calls for an end to all
forms of exploitation for all subjects-of-a-life, not just the majority. By
concentrating on groups of living things, such as species, instead of individuals
themselves, Regan would argue that the use of the utilitarian ethic is inevitable:
For in utilitarianism, Regan argues, it is the principle o f equality that determines
right, wrong, and obligation; what we morally ought to do is act so as to bring
about the best total consequences for everyone affected by the outcome, not
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just the best consequences for the agent who acts.
Regan’s reasons for mistrusting this ethic include the fact that it is unclear
what exactly is meant by the phrase “everyone affected by the outcome”. Which
individuals are included? Regan suspects that by trying to establish the best
“balance” between groups some needless suffering of subjects-of-a-life might
occur. This is not justifiable to Regan.
Because of these views, it can be said that Regan rejects any holistic
approach to ethical theories of rights. It is obvious throughout his entire
argument that Regan maintains it is unclear what could be meant by attributing
rights to collections of individuals. Yet is not a holistic approach more realistic,
since there is such a diversity of life forms on this planet? Would not a more
integrated proposal which sternly considers all living things’ interests be more
comprehensive and representative of the earth as a whole entity?

Respect for All Members of the Biosphere

Those entities that are not either moral agents or moral patients need to
be respected simply as members of the biosphere and as such deserve respect
and consideration as do moral agents or patients; for everything that lives
deserves respect simply because it is a m em ber o f the biosphere. Also,
sentience cannot be the only issue in the same way that a subject-of-a-life
cannot be the only issue. Far more important is the issue of interdependence.
Human animals are part of an interdependent chain of a diverse number of life
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forms. If you consider human animals, for example, as being at the top of an
ecological pyramid, we are much more dependent on lower parts of the pyramid
than the lower parts are on us. W e rely on lower life forms for food, warmth, fuel,
medicines, etc. Thus, in order to continue to be, we are far more likely to
interfere with their lives than they are to interfere with ours as human animals.
So we must exercise extreme caution when our needs for survival disrupt theirs.
Disruption could backfire. W e should, therefore, develop a sense of compassion
and sympathy with these life forms so that we do not inadvertently or deliberately
interfere with their lives any more than is absolutely necessary (see thesis pages
64-67 for discussion of Hume’s notion of sympathy).
Although Regan claims that his subject-of-a-life criterion is non-biased, I
will argue that this cannot be entirely true. It is biased against all beings which
are non-subjects-of-a-life. And with such a diversified, populated planet as Earth,
it seems strange that any theory of rights should seek to exclude most life forms.
It is more plausible to argue for a holistic approach, such as that asserted
by Paul Taylor in his book Respect for Nature. In brief, Taylor endeavors to
account for the relationships among the individuals in an ecosystem while still
retaining the moral locus within the individual. 16 Ultimately, Taylor’s argument
affirms the equal inherent value of all organisms as teleological centers of life,
defined by Taylor as a way of perceiving and understanding each individual
organism as a goal-oriented center of life, pursuing its own good in its own way.

16 T aylo r proposes that w hile the good of an individual is the full d evelopm ent o f its biological powers, the
good of a population of individuals is arrived a t by assessing the optim al a v e ra g e good of individuals in
th a t population.
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Taylor concludes with the claim that just being alive is a sufficient condition for
an individual to deserve respectful treatment.
A view such as Taylor’s is not as restricted as is Regan’s view and it is
partially because of Regan’s limited scope of concern that his argument neglects
many life forms on this planet.
Accordingly, Regan’s argument is adequate up to a point, yet once the
subject-of-a-life criterion is imposed, far too many life forms are excluded. As
will be argued in Chapter 4, it is the goal of the Interdependent Morality Directive
to restructure Regan’s, Taylor’s and, to a lesser extent, Leopold’s arguments in
order to form a stronger, more practical foundation from which a stronger policy
foundation can be implemented. One of the main points of contention is that
which denotes the boundary for which animals are conscious and which are not.
Regan argues that the point from which we must decide which animals
are conscious is that of human beings; for humans are the paradigm cases of
conscious individuals. In other words the human mammal is the standard against
which all other life forms are to be measured. From this starting point, Regan
makes the following argument from analogy: the relationship between human
consciousness and the structure and function of the human nervous system
makes it probable that our consciousness is intimately related to our physiology
and anatomy. Next, Regan notes that mammalian animals are most like us
physiologically and anatomically, thus it is reasonable to conclude that
mammalian animals are likewise conscious.
It is important to state that Regan’s argument does not suggest that only
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those animals that are similar to us anatomically and physiologically can
possibly be conscious. Instead, Regan is arguing that such animals are those for
whom the attribution of consciousness is most well founded. So where one
draws the line regarding the presence of consciousness is no easy matter. For
example, we cannot say with precision, Regan claims, exactly how old or tall
someone must be to be old or tall, respectively, but it does not follow, however,
that we cannot recognize that some people are old or tall. In the same way, we
can distinguish between who is conscious and who is not. It follows that there
are other living animals besides mammals that need to be regarded as having
needs worthy of consideration, namely non-mammals, conscious or not.
Regan alludes to human’s duty to non-mammals, claiming that they need
to be offered some consideration but he does not extensively elaborate on this
issue. It is precisely this omission which is a primary flaw of his argument.
Accordingly, I offer a rival theory that shall fulfill two purposes: (1) it is a more
plausible, hence more cogent counter- argument; and (2) it serves as the
philosophical basis for the Interdependent Morality Directive.
At the beginning of this chapter, key elements to Regan’s argument were
discussed, among them the notion of the rights view. At the end of his book,
Regan claims that the rights view provides adequate grounds for extending
rights to all subjects-of-a-life. He never states the rights, if any, pertaining to any
and all non-subjects-of-a-life.
Regan claims that the rights view could be extended to condemn the
killing of non-mammalian animals (e.g. birds and fish). It is interesting to note,
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however, his reasons for making such a claim: "Even assuming birds and fish
are not subjects-of-a-life, to allow their recreational or economic exploitation is to
encourage the formation o f habits and practices that lead to the violation o f the
rights of animals who are subjects-of-a-life" (Regan, 417, emphasis added). So
human beings can consider the needs of non-subjects-of-a-life, yet such
consideration is done not because of the inherent worth of the non-mammal but
rather because such behavior may lead to the poor treatment of those who are
truly worthy of it, namely mammals ^ .
The ramifications of such an ethic may be dangerous ; for Regan and the
animal rights movement may be guilty of (if I may coin a term) classism.
Classism may be defined as a prejudice or attitude of bias toward the interests of
members of other classes in the classification of the animal kingdom developed
by scientists to classify animals. The fundamental objections to racism and
sexism apply to classism. In the same way it is wrong to presuppose anything
about a particular race or sex, it is equally wrong to assume anything about a
specific class. Thus for the same reasons sexism and racism are wrong,
classism is wrong. This position may seem silly or absurd because it is novel
but it is intended to illustrate the shortsightedness of Regan’s argument. So
Regan may be guilty of classism by neglecting the inherent worth of all members
of the biosphere. The principle of classism does not suggest the absurd. It does
not, for instance, argue that the next step will obviously be to argue against

17 This idea is borrowed from Kant. Kant states that if w e use anim als as a m eans to an end, w e will be
led to use hum an beings as m eans. Specifically, Kant states th a t w e have duties towards the anim als
because thus w e cultivate the corresponding duties towards hum an beings. If o ne is hard with anim als
than one will be hard to his dealings with men.

“subphyla-ism” or “kingdom-ism”. The argument against classism simply extends
the attitude of respect to all members of the biosphere, be they mammal or non
mammal. In other words existence in the class mammalian is neither a
necessary nor sufficient condition for one’s needs and interests to be
considered. While Regan does not say this exactly, he does suggest that such a
claim would not be outside the parameters of his argument. My argument is that
one’s membership in the web of life is sufficient for an individual’s needs and
value to be respected and will be discussed in Chapter 4.
It seems logical to argue in such a way; for life is infinitely complex,
varied, diverse and integrated. Also, it is a dubious claim that some life forms
are deserving respect of their needs while others are not. Indeed Regan’s
argument, were it officially ratified and put into policy, would go a long way in
modifying human’s treatment of non-human animals. Countless non-human
animals would greatly benefit by the implementation of Regan’s thesis for animal
rights. I am not arguing this claim . My argument is that it would not go far
enough. Consequently many deserving life forms besides mammals would
continue to endure needless and appalling suffering and exploitation.
The next section of this chapter serves two purposes. (1) it stands as
testimony to the fact that non-mammals are subjected to needless and absurd
suffering; and (2) it adds support to the argument that a broader, less exclusive
ethic (the Interdependent Morality Directive) is necessary.
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Exploitation o f Non-Mammals in the Farming Industry

Using intensive factory farming techniques, chickens (non-mammals) are
routinely subjected to immeasurable levels of stress and boredom.
Subsequently, this results in these chickens harming one another through
cannibalism or feather-pecking, in which bored birds peck at some outstanding
part of another bird’s plumage. In an effort to prevent such behavior among
chickens, farms employ a de-beaking procedure, which involves inserting
a chick’s head in a guillotine like device which cuts off part of its beak. This is a
exceedingly painful procedure: “Between the horn and the bone is a thin layer of
highly sensitive soft tissue, resembling the quick of the human nail. The hot knife
used in de-beaking cuts through this complex of horn, bone and sensitive tissue,
causing severe pain” (Singer, 99).
There are numerous other examples, all similar in regards to infliction of
needless suffering. Sharks, for instance, are routinely hunted for shark tail soup
as well as for their skin. These non-mammals are caught in huge drift nets,
where they slowly die of suffocation. Many hundreds, if not thousands, of sharks
and other marine life die in this pitiful manner every year. Furthermore, countless
frogs are used in research labs and schools each year, where a practice known
as pithing is employed so that students and/or scientists may observe the
physiological makeup of a living, breathing organism. Pithing involves placing a
thin, sharp object (such as a needle) into a frog’s brain thereby paralyzing it so
that it feels virtually no pain. A dissection ensues while the frog is still alive. Even
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if the frog were to feel no pain, there is still no excuse for this type of impropriety
and it is life forms such as the frog, chicken, shark and many other non
mammals which would not count under Regan’s argument. Classism, therefore,
has the potential of setting a dangerous precedent. The Interdependent Morality
Directive will rely heavily on this notion of classism and its ramifications
in the following chapter.

Regan’s Inattention to Environmental Issues

Equally important to Regan’s practice of classism is his lack of attention to
the environment question. Unlike the mammal/non-mammal question, Regan
never attempts to establish the overriding importance of developing an
environmental ethic that might coexist with his animal right’s ethic.
Regan presents a fleeting comment of the environmental issue towards
the end of his book. He writes of the difficulties of developing a rights-based
environmental ethic, focusing on the irreconcilable differences between
environmentalists and animal rightists. He claims that the individualistic quality
of moral rights held by animal rightists is utterly inconsistent with the holistic
view of nature held by environmentalists.
Regan cites Leopold’s land ethic, stating that it implies that the individual
may be sacrificed for the greater biotic good, in the name of the “integrity,
stability, and beauty of the biotic community” (Leopold, 217). Regan claims that
such a view is no place for the rights of the individual and refers to Leopold’s
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land ethic as "environmental fascism" (Regan, 362). Regan stresses the
importance of the individual in his animal rights argument, claiming that
individual rights must never be outweighed by such considerations as “the
integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community” (Leopold, 217). In
contrast, Leopold argues, as do most environmentalists, that humans are “only
members of the biotic team” (Leopold, 296) and as such have the same moral
standing as any other member of the team. Regan and his followers will not
tolerate such a philosophy, arguing that the individual has rights of paramount
consideration. As Regan states, "Environmental fascism and the rights view are
like oil and water: they don’t mix” (Regan, 362).
Central to Reagan’s opposition to most environmental ethics is the
dilemma one faces when trying to attribute moral rights to collections of things,
such as trees or an ecosystem. Since environmental ethics focus on the
collective unit and not the individual, Regan fears that the individual’s rights will
be lost in the masses.
Nevertheless, Regan does insist that a rights-based environmental ethic
is plausible. He states that the rights view, if it could be successfully extended to
inanimate objects, would advocate a “let be” policy in terms of human’s
interaction with the biotic world; for if humans were to show proper respect for
the rights of the individuals who make up the biotic community, then the
community itself would be preserved. Such an ethic, however, is yet to be
realized. It is part of the goal of the the Interdependent Morality Directive
argument to present the basis for just such an ethic. Analyzed in this way it
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becomes apparent that Regan’s argument for animal rights needs to be strongly
adjusted if it is to fit into an environmentalist paradigm. In the next chapter, we
will extensively analyze the position of two central environmentalists: Aldo
Leopold and Paul Taylor.

CHAPTER 3
IN DEFENSE OF AN ENVIRONMENTAL ETHIC
The Environmental Position: A Critical Analysis
The Land Ethic: A thing is right when it tends to preserve the
integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong
when it tends otherwise (Leopold, 224).

The land ethic, as it is called, is the heart of most environmental
philosophies; for it is on this foundation that many environmental ethicists build
an environmental theory.
This section will critically analyze the land ethic by examining two of its
main proponents: Aldo Leopold and Paul Taylor.

Aldo Leo p o ld ‘s A Sand County Almanac:
A Condensed Analysis
Aldo Leopold argues that a basic lack of human regard for the land itself
lay at the heart of most natural resource and agricultural problems. He claims
that the biotic world and natural environment themselves have intrinsic value.
Rather than dominating and exploiting the natural world, Leopold believed that
humans should consider themselves as members and citizens of the biotic
community, thereby instilling a sense of unity with the environment. In his book A
Sand County Almanac, Leopold first clarifies the notion of human moral
responsibility to the natural environment. The spirit of this responsibility is
34
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captured in his land ethic.
It is helpful, at the outset, to understand exactly what Leopold means
when he uses the term ethic. Leopold uses the word ethic in two separate ways:
(1) ecologically and (2) philosophically. Ecologically an ethic refers to a limitation
on freedom of action in the struggle for existence. In other words, there are
rules, or ethical codes to live by in an integrated social environment which may,
by necessity, limit certain freedoms so as to not infringe on other’s freedoms.
Philosophically refers to a differentiation of social from anti-social conduct, or
ways of behaving that will either serve to create a stable and safe environment
or a lawless state of chaos.
According to Leopold, the very first ethics dealt with relations between
individuals, i.e. The Ten Commandments. Next came ethical codes which dealt
primarily with relations between the individual and society. The Golden Rule, for
example, is one such ethic. It is an attempt to integrate the individual to society,
whereas democracy tries to integrate social organization to the individual.
Leopold points out the fact that there is as yet no ethic dealing with man’s
relation to land, animals and plants. Land, as well as animals, is still property.
And as property, human’s relation to land is still strictly economic, entailing
privileges but no obligations. The extension of ethics to this third element in the
human environment what Leopold hopes to establish with the Land Ethic.
Leopold claims that establishing such an ethic is both an evolutionary possibility
and an ecological necessity. Leopold, therefore, is calling for a new, third ethic;
one which takes into consideration human beings’ special relationships to land,

animals and plants. Leopold claims that this ethic should be a “mode of
guidance for meeting ecological situations” (Leopold, 202); for in it we find a
merging of both the ecological ethic and philosophical ethic. It is an ecological
ethic, as evidenced by the first part of the land ethic: “A thing is right when it
tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community”
(Leopold, 224-25) in that it places limits as to how “free” human beings can
interact with the biosphere. It is also a philosophical ethic because it
distinguishes between what would socially acceptable and unacceptable, as we
see in the last part of the ethic: “It is wrong when it tends otherwise” (Leopold,
224). The land ethic takes the respect of the land very seriously, while it
prescribes a way of acting toward it.
Leopold’s land ethic is the foundation of his entire environmental theory.
This theory is a compilation of several concepts, the most significant being that
of community. Crucial to this concept is the idea that the individual is a member
of a community of interdependent parts. “The land ethic simply enlarges the
boundaries of the community to include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or
collectively the land” (Leopold, 204). So Leopold’s community is not just
composed of people, it includes the soil, waters, plants and non-human animals.
Leopold, therefore, is calling for a new, more holistic definition of human
being’s relationship to nature, where the individual must consider herself as a
part of the land and not an entity apart from it. is The individual is a part of the
land in several ways. First, she is literally a component of minerals and elements

18 Leopold’s philosophy is in direct conflict to R egan 's rights view discussed in the previous chapter.
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found in land, such as salt, carbon and hydrogen. Also water, which makes up
over 75% of the earth’s surface, is also the major substance of the human body.
So part of every human being’s physiological make-up comes from the land (and
water) itself. Next, there is the concept that humans and nature both occupy time
and space together; that is they are members of one planet, Earth. And as
members of the same planet, humans and nature possess a close relationship
with one another. So in many different ways, humans are part of the land.
Leopold elaborates on his idea of the community concept, stating that
such a concept is somewhat novel. Humans are not used to thinking of
themselves in terms of members of a larger community which includes the land
itself. As support for this claim, Leopold calls our attention to the manner in
which we, as human beings, treat various members of the biosphere. He
remarks on our total indifference to the importance of soil; the sewage we dump
in our oceans, lakes and rivers; the plant life we exterminate in the name of
progress; and the animals we make extinct. Leopold states that a land ethic, by
itself, cannot prevent the alteration, management, and use of these ‘resources,’
but it does affirm their right to continued existence in a natural state, meaning
that members of the biosphere ought to be allowed to live out their existence
with as little interference from humans as possible. Calves, for instance, ought to
be allowed to romp and run freely in the wild, not tethered to a crate waiting to
be slaughtered. Tropical rain forests should not be mindlessly cleared away to
accommodate hotels, apartments, or shopping malls. In short, Leopold is
claiming that the land ethic alters the role of humans “from conqueror of the
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land-community to plain member and citizen of it” (Leopold, 204). And with this
ethic, Leopold argues, will come a respect for the fellow-members and for the
community.
A practical extension to this concept is what Leopold refers to as the land
pyramid which is derived, in part, from a related idea found in ecology known as
the biotic pyramid.
Leopold’s land pyramid is simple. Plants absorb energy from the sun,
which flows through a circuit called the biota, which may be represented by a
pyramid consisting of layers. The bottom layer is the soil. A plant layer rests on
the soil, an insect layer on the plants, a bird and rodent layer on the insects, and
so on through various animal groups to the top layer, which consists of the large
carnivores. Leopold claims that the pyramid is a tangle of chains so complex as
to seem disorderly, yet it proves to be a highly organized structure. Its
functioning depends on the cooperation and competition of its diverse parts. It is
obvious that this is how Leopold views the earth and ail its components; as one
complex web of interdependent parts. In accordance with this view, Leopold
argues that land is not merely soil but rather a foundation of energy flowing
through a circuit of soils, plants, and animals. Food chains are the living
channels which conduct energy upward; death and decay return it to the soil.
In sum, Leopold argues that nature is a very complex, sophisticated and
highly diversified web of life of which we, as humans, are part. Leopold himself
best captures the essence of this notion in the following quote: “Men are only
fellow-voyagers with other creatures in the odyssey of evolution.” (Leopold, 194).
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Paul T ay lo r‘s Concept of Respect for Nature:
A Condensed Analysis

In his book Respect for Nature Paul Taylor argues that human beings are
members of the earth’s living community but are not inherently superior to other
living things. Each organism, according to Taylor, possesses what he calls a
teleological center of life, which Taylor defines as a unique individual pursuing
its own good in its own way.
Taylor’s argument is quite complex in that it involves numerous subarguments.19 There are three main parts to Taylor’s ethical system: (1) the
biocentric outlook (2) the attitude of respect for nature , and (3) the basic rules
of conduct. W e shall begin by analyzing Taylor’s concept of the biocentric
outlook and the attitude of respect for nature, since these two parts are
interdependent. But before analyzing the four principles that compose the
biocentric outlook and the attitude of respect for nature, it is necessary to define
what Taylor means by the term biocentric outlook.
The biocentric outlook is a belief-system based on an attitude of respect
for nature. Taylor argues that unless we grasp what it means to accept the
biocentric outlook and therefore view the natural order from its perspective, we
cannot see the point of adopting an attitude of respect for nature. To understand
how and why the biocentric outlook can help us understand respect for nature, it
is necessary to analyze it in more detail, thus I will now focus on the four major
19 It requires, therefore, a more extensive analysis than w as given to either Leopold or Regan. This thesis
will present as concise an analysis as possible without sacrificing accuracy.
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principles that form its core. They are as follows:
(1) The belief that humans are members of the Earth's
Community of Life in the same sense and on the same terms in
which other living things are members of that Community;
(2) The belief that the human species, along with all other species,
are integral elements in a system of interdependence such that the
survival of each living thing, as well as its chances of faring well or
poorly, is determined not only by the physical conditions of its
environment but also by its relations to other living things;
(3) The belief that all organisms are teleological centers of life in
the sense that each is a unique individual pursuing its own good in
its own way;
(4) The belief that humans are not inherently superior to other
living things (Taylor, 99).

Collectively, these four principles embody a coherent perspective on the
natural world and the place humans occupy in it.
W e will now examine each of these four principles:

Principle 1 - The belief that humans are members of the Earth’s
Community o f Life in the same sense and on the same terms in
which other living things are members of the Community (Taylor,
99).

Here, Taylor is claiming that from the perspective of the biocentric outlook
on nature we see human life as an integral part o f the natural order of the Earth’s
biosphere. Most important is that with an acceptance of the biocentric outlook
comes the realization that there is a common relationship we share with wild
animals and plantsso.
So Taylor is emphasizing the fact, as did Aldo Leopold in Sand County
2 0 M y italics; this idea is a founding principle of the Interdependent M orality Directive, which will be
discussed in subsequent sections.
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Almanac, that life is a sophisticated network of a myriad of life forms that are all,
in some way, related to each other. He refers to this complex combination as the
Earth’s Universal Community o f Life.
Expanding on this first principle, Taylor claims that there are five
conditions o f existence shared by both humans and nonhumans. Collectively,
these five conditions establish a community of beings that give humans a sense
of oneness with all other living things and lead us to see ourselves as members
of one great Community of Life. They are :

(1) W e as well as nonhuman animals and plants must face
certain biological and physical requirements for our survival and
well being; (2) They as well as we have a good of their own;
(3) Although the concepts of free will, autonomy, and social
freedom apply only to humans, there is a fourth sense of freedom,
which is absence of constraints, that holds equally of them and of
us, and this kind of freedom is of great importance in any living
thing’s struggle to realize its good, whether human or nonhuman;
(4) As a species we humans are a recent arrival on our planet;
(5) While we cannot do without them, they can do without us.
(Taylor, 101).

In analyzing point #1, Taylor argues that if we want to preserve our
existence and live at a superior level of well-being, the biological requirements
of survival and physical health must be made our normative guides. So we must
follow, according to Taylor, biologically enlightened principles that ensure the
conditions essential to life. Taylor’s first principle states that we must be careful
not to deprive ourselves of the very means necessary to assure subsistence of
the biological requirements inherent to all life forms.
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In point #2, Taylor suggests that everything that is alive can be correctly
said to have a good; that one might fare well or poorly and that these things so
central to the meaning of our everyday existence can be asserted literally and
without distortion about animals and plants as well as ourselves. In other words,
Taylor is claiming that we are all vulnerable.
In point #3 Taylor claims that there is a distinct parallel between human
life and the life of other creatures. This parallel is centered around freedom.
Taylor uses the term freedom in a special way: freedom calls for the absence of
constraints. It applies to animals and plants as much as it does to humans. This
freedom is an instrumental good for all members of the biosphere. It is valuable
to nonhumans, according to Taylor, for the same reason it is valuable to
humans. For them as well as for us, to be free is to have a better chance to live
the best kind of life we are capable of. Calves, for example, should be allowed to
romp and run in the open fields, not tethered in a crate. Monkeys should be left
alone in the wild, allowed to live out their lives unfettered by human interference.
So in condition #3 Taylor illustrates his “other sense" of freedom by which it is
significant to all life forms.
Taylor’s fourth point in which we as humans may be identified as
members of the Earth’s Community of Life concerns our common origin with
other living things. As support for this, Taylor focuses on the concept of
evolution claiming that evolution offers a unified explanation for the existence of
both human and nonhuman forms of life. To understand how others came to be
is to understand how we came to be. “Within the conceptual, explanatory system
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set by the theory of evolution , we understand ourselves as beings that fit into
the same structure of reality that accounts for every other life from of life"
(Taylor, 112). So, here we have yet another affirmation that life on earth is a
complex web of related beings.
Taylor’s fifth and final condition calls for the denial that humans are
superior to all other life forms or that they are free from depending on other life
forms. In this last condition, Taylor argues that as human beings, we are in no
position to claim superiority over any life form and to claim such superiority is
pointedly arrogant of the human species. Taylor states that from a biological
point of view, humans are absolutely dependent upon the soundness and good
health of the Earth’s biosphere, but its soundness and good health were not in
the least dependent upon humans. In short, “should it disintegrate, we will exist
no more" (Taylor, 125).
Taylor points out that on the other hand our demise would be no loss to
other species, nor would it adversely affect the natural environment. On the
contrary, other living things would be much benefited. The physical environment
of the Earth would be greatly improved. Tropical forests would develop again,
contributing to a life-sustaining atmosphere. All bodies of water would slowly
become clear again. So in this final condition Taylor firmly rejects the popular
notion that human beings are superior to and independent of all other life forms.
These preceding five points elaborate on the first premise of Taylor’s
argument which calls for a biocentric outlook and an attitude of respect for
nature. Recall that the first principle is:
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Principle 1 - The belief that humans are members of the Earth’s
Community o f Life in the same sense and on the same terms in
which other living things are members o f the Community
(Taylor, 99).

In light of the five points aforementioned, this principle is strongly
established.
Taylor’s second principle involves viewing the natural world as being an
interdependent system. Recall how principle #2 is stated:

Principle 2 - The belief that the human species, along with all other
species, are integral elements in a system o f interdependence such
that the survival o f each living thing, as well as its chances of faring
well or poorly, is determined not only by the physical conditions of
its environment but also by its relations to other living things (Taylor,
99).

Basically, this principle expands on Leopold’s concept of the entire world
being a web of life, each thread of the web effecting another. Taylor is
suggesting that we view the natural world as a system of interdependence.
Taylor claims that by accepting the biocentric outlook and regarding ourselves
and the world from its perspective is to see the whole natural domain of living
things and their environment as an order of interconnected objects and events.
Taylor illustrates this system of interdependence with the following example:
W hen alligators are trapped and killed (to supply skins to the
makers of expensive shoes and handbags), the whole Everglades
ecosystem suffers. The pools dry up, the marine life disappears,
and the balance of life in the watery grassland is destroyed.
Certain species of fish die off and, during rainy seasons, other
species intrude into the area in great numbers. They had formerly
been kept in check by their natural predator, the alligators. Thus
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the entire area undergoes deep ecological changes, which if not
reversed, will spell the end of the ecosystem itself (Taylor, 116).

Thus, we see how one action on one part of the web of life effects another
part of the web of life. Recall that Taylor claims that no life community
associated with a particular ecological system is an isolated unit. It is directly or
indirectly connected with other life communities. So if the biocentric outlook
forms the basis of our perspective on human life, we will see ourselves as an
integral part of the system of nature. As a result, “we will then recognize that our
faring well or poorly depends to a great extent on the role we choose to play in
the web of life. W e will realize that if we try to break our connections with that
web we will thereby destroy our chances for pursuing our uniquely human
values" (Taylor, 117). Thus, Taylor is arguing against human-centered ethics
and arguing for an ethics system which includes all life forms.
In his third principle, Taylor argues that individual organisms need to be
considered as teleological centers of life:
Principle 3 - The belief that all organisms are teleological centers
of life in the sense that each is a unique individual pursuing its own
good in its own way (Taylor, 99-100).

Here, the focus is on the lives of individual organisms. Taylor states that
when humans have an accurate understanding of individual organisms as
teleological centers of life, such a view does not imply that we are falsely
anthropomorphizing such beings. It does not involve “reading into” other living
things human characteristics. It is not necessary, Taylor states, that we consider

46
them to have consciousness .21 Organisms like trees, for instance, do not have
a conscious life. They are not aware of the world around them. They have no
thoughts or feelings and therefore have no interest in anything that happens to
them. Yet they have a good o f their own around which their behavior is
organized. All organisms, whether conscious or not, are teleological centers of
life.
So Taylor is maintaining that although organisms may not be conscious,
they nonetheless have an intrinsic good, an inherent good, around which their
behavior is organized in an attempt to maintain and protect their existence. By
accepting all living things in this way, Taylor argues, humans can develop a full
understanding of each living things point of view. Therefore, once humans
conceive of each organism as a teleological center of life we will then have the
capacity needed to make the moral commitment involved in taking the attitude of
respect toward it.
Taylor’s fourth and final principle is as follows:
Principle 4 - The belief that humans are not inherently superior to
other living things (Taylor, 99).

Now in this last principle, Taylor is stressing a vital concept: the denial of
human superiority. Taylor states that of all the elements that make up the
biocentric outlook, this aspect is the most important, as well as the most
controversial. By viewing the realm of nature and life from the perspective of the
first three elements of the biocentric outlook, we will see ourselves as having a
21 This concept of an organism not needing to be conscious in o rder to be granted ethical considerations
is yet another founding principle of the Interdependent Morality Directive.
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deep kinship with all other living things, sharing with them many common
characteristics and being, like them, integral parts of one great planet.
Thus, we have Taylor’s four elements that make up the biocentric outlook.
According to Taylor, each of these four principles fit together in an internally
coherent way to form a comprehensive view of the entire realm of life and nature
on our planet. Taylor claims these four elements are a general "map” of the
natural world, enabling us to see where we are and how we fit into the total
scheme of things.
After analyzing two of the three parts of Taylor's ethical system, we now
move on to the third part, which Taylor refers to as the basic rules of conduct.
This is a system of standards and rules that moral agents would be guided by if
they were to accept the biocentric outlook and take the attitude of respect for
nature. First, Taylor explains how his concept of duty relates to his rules of
conduct, stating that the first thing to notice is that the basic rules of conduct are
principles that specify different types of duty. These principles do not
themselves always determine what a particular moral agent 22 jn a particular set
of circumstances ought to do, all things considered. The rules of duty, Taylor
argues, tell us what general kinds of actions we are morally required to perform
or refrain from performing. Thus Taylor is setting the parameters of his rules of
conduct, in that certain duties may apply at certain times.
Taylor further elucidates the concept of duty by focusing on the
perception of conflict of duties. Taylor defines two levels of conflicts of duties.

2 2 T aylo r defines a m oral agent/patient in the s a m e m anner as T o m R egan does, Section 1, C hapter 2.

48
The first level involves addressing the problems that arise when we are
confronted with a conflict of duties. Taylor claims that in such cases if we follow
one rule, then we violate others. In order to decide what is the act that should be
done in these circumstances, we must find out which alternative to our choice is
the one that has the weightiest moral reasons behind it; that is to say, we must
know which of the conflicting duties takes priority over all the others, similar to a
rule-utilitarian based ethic. This will be determined by an ordering of the rules
according to a set of priority principles. On the basis of those principles, Taylor
claims, we can make a well-grounded judgment as to which duty outweighs the
others in the given circumstances.
The second level of conflict of duties occurs when the rules of a valid
system of environmental ethics are in opposition to the rules of a valid system of
human ethics, in other words human moral codes come in direct conflict with
environmental moral codes. Taylor argues that in these cases if we carry out our
duties to animals and plants in natural ecosystems, then we fail in our duties
toward our fellow humans, but if we fulfill the latter we do not do what is required
of us regarding the good of nonhumans. So even when we have worked out an
acceptable ordering among the rules of ethics of respect for nature, we still must
decide on what priorities hold between that system and the rules that bind us in
the domain of human ethics. Taylor states that because of this factor, it must be
maintained that any duties enumerated might be outweighed in certain
circumstances by duties that moral agents owe to humans. The fact that we
have a duty not to destroy or harm animals and plants in natural ecosystems,
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Taylor argues, does not mean never do such things under any circumstances
whatever. It only means that we must not do them without a sufficient moral
reason that justifies overriding our duty to refrain. So, Taylor is not claiming that
these rules of conduct provide an exhaustive account of every valid duty of the
ethics of respect for nature. Instead, Taylor is stating that these duties or rules
of conduct are intended to cover only the more important ones that typically
arise in everyday life. Taylor names the four rules as follows (a) the Rule of
Nonmaleficence, (b) the Rule of Noninterference, (c) the Rule of Fidelity, and (d)
the Rule of Restitutive Justice.
Taylor’s Rule of Nonmaleficence refers to the duty not to do harm to any
entity in the natural environment that has a good of its own. It includes the duty
not to kill an organism and not to destroy a species-population or biotic
community, as well as the duty to refrain from any action that would be seriously
detrimental to the good of an organism, species-population, or life community. In
general, this rule prohibits harmful and destructive acts done by moral agents.
Taylor claims that it does not apply to the behavior of a nonhuman animal or the
activity of a plant that might bring harm to another living thing or cause its death,
such as what occurs when a Rough-legged Hawk pounces on a field mouse,
killing it. According to Taylor’s rules, nothing morally wrong has occurred.
Although the hawk’s behavior can be thought of as something it does
intentionally, it is not the action of a moral agent. So it does not fall within the
range of the Rule of Nonmaleficence. The hawk does not violate any duty
because it has no duties. Taylor offers a counter example where a Peregrine
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Falcon has been taken from the wild by a falconer, who then trains it to hunt,
seize, and kill wild birds under his direction. Here what is happening is
something quite different. Human conduct is directly aimed at controlling and
manipulating and organism for the enjoyment of a sport that involves to other
wild organisms, thus the wrong being done is by the falc o n er, who is the moral
agent. Taylor illustrates how the Rule of Nonmaleficence is to be understood as
it relates to moral agents and moral patients.
Next, we examine Taylor’s second rule of conduct, which he refers to as
the Rule of Noninterference. Taylor claims that two sorts of negative duties fall
under this claim. One requires us to refrain from placing restrictions on the
freedom of individual organisms, and the other requires a general “hands o ff
policy with regard to whole ecosystems and biotic communities, as well as
individual organisms.
Taylor begins to explain these duties by providing a special definition of
freedom involving the absence of constraint, where a constraint is any condition
that prevents or hinders the normal activity and healthy development of an
animal or plant. Taylor claims that a being is free in this sense when any of four
types of constraints that could weaken, impair, or destroy its ability to adapt
successfully to its environment are absent from its existence and circumstances.
To be free is to be free from these constraints and to be free to pursue the
realization of one’s good according to the laws of one's nature.
The four types of constraints Taylor refers to are:
(i) Positive external constraints (cages, traps)
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(ii) Negative external constraints (no water or food available)
(iii) Positive internal constraints (disease, ingested poison)
(iv) Negative internal constraints (weaknesses and
incapacities due to injured organs or tissues)
Taylor argues that humans can restrict the freedom of animals and plants
in one of two ways: (a) directly imposing some of these constraints upon them
or (b) by producing changes in their environments which then act as constraints
upon them.23 Thus, this explicates the first type of negative duty Taylor
mentions which requires us to refrain from placing any restrictions on the
freedom of individual organisms.
Next, we move to Taylor’s second kind of duty that comes under this rule:
the duty to let wild creatures live out their lives in freedom. Here freedom does
not mean the absence of constraints. Instead it calls for humans to allow an
organism to complete its existence in a wild state. With regard to individual
organisms, Taylor argues, this duty requires us to refrain from capturing them
and removing them from their natural habitats, no matter how well we might treat
them.z4 W e have violated the duty of noninterference, Taylor stresses, even if
we save them by taking them out of a natural danger or by restoring their health
after becoming ill in the wild, unless w e return the creature to the wild as soon as
possible. When we take young trees or wildflowers from a natural ecosystem, for
example, and transplant them in landscaped grounds, we break the Rule of

23 This concept is crucial to the the Interdependent Morality Directive paradigm and will be incorporated
accordingly.
24 This concept is a basic foundation of the the Interdependent M orality Directive paradigm .
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Noninterference whether or not we then take good care of them and so enable
them to live longer, healthier lives than they would have enjoyed in the wild. W e
have done a wrong by not letting them live out their lives in a natural way. So the
duty of noninterference, like that of nonmaleficence, is a purely negative duty. It
does not require us to perform any actions, but only to respect an organism’s
wild condition by letting it alone.
Next is Taylor’s Rule of Fidelity which applies only to human conduct in
relation to individual animals in a wild state capable of being deceived or
betrayed by moral agents. Taylor claims that under this rule fall three duties;
(a) not to break a trust that a wild animal places in us (as shown by its behavior);
(b) not to deceive or mislead any animal’s expectations, which it has formed on
the basis of one’s past actions with it; and (c) to be true to one’s intentions as
made known to an animal when such an animal has come to rely on one.
Although w e cannot make mutual agreements with wild animals, we can act in
such a manner as to call fourth their trust in us. Thus the basic moral
requirement imposed by the Rule of Fidelity is that we remain faithful to that
trust.
As examples of non-compliance with this rule, Taylor cites instances of
hunting, trapping and fishing. In certain circumstances, however, such practices
may be morally permissible, such as when the only means for obtaining food or
clothing essential to human survival is by hunting, trapping, or fishing. Taylor
states that the ethical principles that justify these actions could stem from a
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system of human ethics based on respect for persons plus a priority principle
that makes the duty to provide for human survival outweigh those duties of
nonmaleficence, noninterference and fidelity that are owed to nonhumans.
Finally, there is Taylor’s fourth rule of conduct entitled The Rule of
Restitutive Justice. In its most general terms this rule imposes the duty to restore
the balance of justice between a moral agent and a moral patient when the
patient has been wronged by the agent. Taylor argues that common to all
instances in which a duty of restitutive justice arises, an agent has broken a valid
moral rule and by doing so has upset the balance of justice between himself
and a moral subject. To hold oneself accountable for having done such an act is
to acknowledge a special duty one has taken upon oneself by that wrongdoing.
This special duty is the duty of restitutive justice. It requires one to make amends
to the moral subject by some form of compensation or reparation. This is the way
one restores the balance of justice that had held between oneself and the
subject before a rule of duty was transgressed
The lynchpin to Taylor's four rules of conduct is this last one. If moral
agents violate any of first three rules, they do an injustice to something in the
natural world. The act destroys the balance of justice between humanity and
nature, and a special duty is incurred by the agents involved. This is the duty
laid down by the fourth rule of environmental ethics, Taylor’s Rule of Restitutive
Justice.
Taylor is arguing, therefore that human beings should all share in the cost
of preserving and restoring some areas of wild nature for the sake of the plant
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and animal communities that live there. Only then can we claim to have genuine
respect for nature.

Which Life Forms Count ? Evaluating Taylor’s and Leopold’s Position in Terms of
Tom Regan’s Ethical Position

An evaluation of Taylor and Leopold’s argument will show that although
internally there may not be many weak areas vulnerable to attack, globally the
issue of animal rights still remains unclear. Neither Leopold nor Taylor explicitly
extends their environmental ethics directly to nonhuman animals. I begin by
examining Taylor’s position.
Taylor makes several references to the animal rights issue, yet no precise
moral paradigm for the treatment of animals together with the ecosystem is ever
discussed. Of course since Taylor is not specifically an animal rightist but an
environmentalist, his focus is not placed squarely on animal rights, but on the
environment. Yet an animal right’s argument would not be totally inconsistent
with Taylor’s work thus far. Taylor does not argue that animals and plants have
moral rights in the same sense that human persons do. Instead, it is the attitude
of respect for nature which requires moral agents to live in harmony with the
aforementioned four duties toward nature. Yet how would such a posture impact
nonhuman animals? Consider Taylor’s four principles of respect for nature.
Recall Taylor’s first duty towards nature:

55
Principle 1 - The belief that humans are members o f the Earth's
Community o f Life in the same sense and on the same terms in
which other living things are members o f the Community (Taylor,
99-100).

Here is a claim stating humans are members of the community of life on
earth. Taylor’s use of the word members is significant in that it suggests that
humans must use the earth’s resources in a considerate manner, remembering
that there are other members of the biosphere needing to use these same
resources. Taylor uses the phrase community o f life which is another salient use
of words; for by doing so Taylor is arguing that life is a not an isolated unit but
rather a sophisticated system of units. This is an important quality of his
argument and one that the the Interdependent Morality Directive paradigm will
utilize extensively.
So by carefully selecting the words used, Taylor makes a very convincing
argument for nonhuman animals being members of the Earth’s Community. With
this concept as the basic posture of human animals toward nonhuman animals,
the beginnings of equal treatment are strengthened.
Taylor’s first principle is an suitable extension to Leopold’s environmental
philosophy. It builds on Leopold’s community concept, which states that the
individual is a member of a community of interdependent parts. By suggesting
that humans and nonhumans share the same biosphere, Taylor allows the
possibility of myriad life forms to be included in the social circle of moral
concern.
In contrast, Taylor’s first principle is not receptive to Regan’s concept of
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subject-of-a-life philosophy. Regan’s philosophy denotes a specific set of
prerequisites that a life form must fulfill if it is to be included in the sphere of
moral concern, which virtually excludes almost all life forms besides mammals.
Recall that Regan basically rejects any holistic-based argument calling such
claims environmental fascism. Because of such views, it would be quite difficult
to infuse a community based principle such as Taylor’s into Regan’s argument.
So, if these two factions are ever to work together, it becomes necessary
to reconstruct these two representative philosophies, which is what the
Interdependent Morality Directive seeks to accomplish.
Next, I examine Taylor’s second principle which states that the human
species, along with other species, are critical elements in a system of
interdependence such that the survival of each living thing is determined, in
part, by its relation to other living things.
As with the first principle, Taylor stresses the idea of life on earth being
an all-out system of interdependence. Again Taylor’s principle is parallel to
many of Leopold’s, mainly since both constantly amplify the necessity of viewing
the entire biosphere as a unit. In this second principle, Taylor claims that each
living thing’s relation to one another is not merely gratuitous, but rather a vital
component of life itself, one that makes life possible.
The attitude Regan would have towards this second principle would
probably be one of contempt because it is holistic in nature, requiring the
individual to tolerate him as being a part of a group, instead just of an individual.
Taylor’s second principle is entirely consistent with the Interdependent
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Morality Directive, since it bases most of its argument on the vital link between
all members of the biosphere.
Taylor's third principle states that all organisms are teleological centers of
life. Teleological centers of life means that each life form is a unique individual
pursuing its own good in its own way.
Regan might not react to this claim with the same fervor applied to
Taylor's first two principles. Here Taylor shifts the focus to the individual,
highlighting the inherent value of the individual claiming that each is actively
living out its existence as best it can in its own manner. Regan would probably
look favorably on this principle because the emphasis is not on the collective
whole nor the environment but squarely on the individual. The upshot of Taylor’s
third principle that may frustrate Regan is that individuals would need to respect
other’s who are actively pursuing their own good; such an ethic may infringe on
the rights of the individual, yet such an ethic is not out of line with the
Interdependent Morality Directive.
Taylor’s fourth and final principle is the lynchpin to his entire argument.
By stating that humans are not inherently superior to other living things, Taylor
cements his entire argument together. This premise alone allows all members of
the biosphere to start at the same point morally and such a claim is necessary
for the the Interdependent Morality Directive paradigm to function.
Furthermore, to insist that humans are superior to all other living things is
nothing but human arrogance. Human animals are not morally superior to any
life form. Human animals are one of the rare species that kills its own species for
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reasons such as money, prestige, love, power, or perhaps for no reason
whatsoever. The majority of life forms besides humans do not kill for such
reasons. There are humans who are unfaithful, cheating, manipulating, selfish
creatures full of avarice, deceit and callousness. Although not all humans exhibit
such vices, enough human animals do display such characteristics such that life
can become a miserable state of affairs. Such behavior is not common among
other life forms. So the claim that humans are morally superior to other life forms
is dubious.
Moreover, most other life forms are not guilty of destroying the biosphere,
unlike human animals. The destruction of the biosphere caused by human
animals is outrageous. No other life form can claim such an atrocious distinction;
for the human animal has a monopoly on global destruction. W e poison the
lakes and rivers in the name of progress, all the while unaware that we are, in a
sense, destroying ourselves. W e spew toxins into the air that all life forms need
to exist. W e discard decaying debris into landfills and oceans, rarely considering
the needs of the life forms inhabiting these areas. Other life forms have not the
capacity to act in such an irresponsible, pitiful fashion. Instead other life forms
are exploited and victimized by human animals. They are at our mercy. And the
foremost reason for such reckless behavior is the claim that we as humans are
morally and intellectually superior to other life forms. Indeed, if human animals
were any more superior, the planet would cease to exist (and this possibility is
not as absurd as it may seem).
This chapter began with a quote of the land ethic. In that ethic, we find

two things: (1) the quintessence of both Taylor’s and Leopold’s argument; and
(2) part of what is lacking in Regan’s argument. There are an infinite number of
life forms in the biosphere and each one is inherently equal. Both Taylor and
Regan are more or less in agreement with this idea; for while Regan accepts the
claim that all animals are equal, Regan would probably not accept the claim that
all members of the biosphere are inherently equal or that they deserve the same
moral consideration as all other life forms. Leopold, in contrast, would
completely agree with Taylor, arguing that such a claim is completely consistent
with the land ethic.
So a restructuring of both the animal rights position and the
environmental position is necessary. The foundation just such an ethic is
examined in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 4
The Interdependent Morality Directive
The Interdependent Morality Directive Defined and Explained

The Interdependent Morality Directive (IMD): The correct conduct
toward any member of the biosphere is that which fosters
conditions that are at least necessary, if not sufficient, for its
continued existence in a natural s ta te d .

The Interdependent Morality Directive (IMD) argues that the conduct
towards any member of the biosphere is intuitively mandated by appropriate
actions concerning those conditions (hereby referred to as inherent needs) that
are basic to its survival for continued existence in a natural state. Although
these inherent needs tend to vary greatly with each member of the biosphere,
each member has a prima facie claim to equal consideration of its inherent
needs. Thus any behavior that will have an impact on a member of the biosphere
needs to be implemented in such a way that its inherent needs will not be
violated but maintained and/or enriched.
The IMD places a sharp emphasis on two primary elements: (1) the
inherent value of all living things cannot be earned or lost. It is simply a
component of any living thing the moment it comes into existence; and (2) since
we as humans, do not know the exact importance of each member of the

25 T he term 'natural state” refers to a condition of existence w here m em bers of th e biosphere a re able to
live with m inim al interference from others. For exam ple, nonhum an anim als should be able to live in
forests, jungles, and oceans without fea r of being hunted or captured.
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biosphere, it would be in our best interests to treat all members of the biosphere
as if they were parts of a whole, where each member plays some significant role
in the natural world.
Briefly, I will examine the 3 primary principles of IMD then consider each
principle in detail.
FIRST PRINCIPLE: All life forms have an inherent worth and as such are
never to be treated as mere objects of intent, i.e. things existing merely for
others;
SECOND PR IN CIPLE: All human animals have the capacity to realize
and develop a true sense of compassion towards most members of the
biosphere;
THIRD PRINCIPLE: As human beings w e lack perfect knowledge about
the relative importance of each life form and we should, therefore, treat all life
forms as part of a larger whole; that is as members of an integral part of the
biosphere that are in some way dependent on one another for survival.
So if we accept the first, second and third principle of IMD. then will we
learn to fee[ our interdependence with other members of the biosphere. By doing
so we will learn to restrain our actions accordingly, as directed by a community
ethic.
As an example of this, consider how the inherent needs of a seal are
sometimes influenced when we, as human animals, do not consider it as a
significant member of the biosphere and refuse or are unable to see the impact
of such shortsightedness. Six-pack plastic rings are a convenient, practical way
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to store and sell six-pack cans of beverages and are used in virtually every part
of the world. But there is a downside to these rings of plastic. When discarded,
they often end up in land-fills or are emptied into a body of water, such as a lake,
river or ocean. If discarded in or near an ocean, these plastic rings often snag
young seals who mistaken the rings for food. The young seal’s head becomes
trapped in the six-pack holder. Unable to free itself, it slowly dies of strangulation
as the young seal’s body grows larger and larger inside the plastic ring. This is a
slow, miserable death that could have been entirely prevented. How? If human
animals had considered the impact their actions have on these members of the
biosphere. Such awareness and sensitivity would necessitate action and the sixpack plastic rings, for example, could be cut before they are discarded. This
would eliminate the possibility of a seal, dolphin, or any other animal
accidentally becoming entangled in the plastic rings. So the IMD would direct
actions in such a way that humans could begin to play a more aware and
interdependent role in other animals welfare. In turn these practices would
enable human animals to see and feel that their behavior is directly connected to
the lives of other members of the biosphere.
By acting in accordance with these three ideas, the ethical standard
known as the Interdependent Morality Directive can be established and
implemented into those policy areas which will affect the inherent needs of any
member of the biosphere.
I now examine the IMD argument in detail.
First, the IMD claims that all life forms have an inherent worth and as
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such are never to be treated as mere objects or things existing for mere utility to
another life form. This premise is based on two concepts: first, Paul Taylor’s
concept of inherent worth, which is derived from another ethic of Taylor’s, the
attitude of respect for nature (discussed in Ch. 3); and second, Tom Regan’s
principle of inherent value (discussed in Ch. 2).
Taylor argues that to adopt an attitude of respect for nature is to regard
wild plants and animals of the Earth’s natural ecosystems as possessing
inherent worth. Taylor uses the term inherent worth to be attributed only to
entities that have a good of their own. Their value is inherent only in the sense
that they are valued because of their their noncommercial importance,
independently of any practical use to which they could be put. Thus a cow
valued only for its worth as a milk producer has no inherent value. If it is true that
any member of the biosphere has inherent worth, then it must posses such worth
regardless of any instrumental value it may have and without reference to the
good of any other being.
In the same way, Tom Regan’s concept of inherent value refers to the
value of an individual as a subject-of-a-life and it is possessed by all individuals
who are subjects-of-a-life. Inherent value is independent of the instrumental
value of the individual for others and also is independent of the value of that
individual’s experiences, such as how much pleasure that individual has or how
cultivated its tastes are. Inherent value, therefore, is a constant for all subjectsof-a-life. The worth of such an individual is fixed and eternal.
In the First Principle of the IMD, Regan’s and Taylor’s concept of inherent

worth is modified and expanded to integrate all members of the biosphere. The
condition of respect for the interdependence of all beings is the key adjustment.
Because interdependence is highly significant in the IMD paradigm, there is a
great emphasis on the attitude of respect for all members of the biosphere,
regardless of what sector of the biosphere they occupy. Life forms are not ours
to do with as we please; for we know not the role each life form plays in nature.
W e do know that while human beings are advanced life forms in some respects,
we are also eminently dependent on less advanced life forms for basic
necessities of life. Therefore, less advanced life forms have a value that is within
itself and no other life form can ever claim that a member of the biosphere is
worthless or at their disposal. The gist of this first principle, therefore, is intrinsic
worth cannot be divorced from the concept of interdependence.
The Second Principle claims the following: all human animals have the
capacity to realize and develop a sense of compassion towards any member of
the biosphere, thereby allowing all members of the the biosphere to achieve and
maintain a healthy existence in a natural state.
The source of this principle is established in the philosophical theories of
the 18th century Scottish philosopher David Hume in his work A Treatise of
Human Nature. Among other elements, the Treatise concentrates on the
foundations of morality. Hume argues that human beings are equipped to lead
useful moral lives because they are universally endowed by nature with the
feeling, or sentiment, of sympathy. In Books II and III of the Treatise, Hume
claims that by observing humans, one sees that people have a genuine sense of
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feeling for others. When we see another person in distress, Hume claims, the
suffering of that person causes us to suffer. The feelings of one person affect the
feelings of another. Through the sentiment of sympathy w e are able to feel
another’s pain as our own. This sympathy is naturally aroused in us and causes
us to want to help. W e have a desire to help because w e have a genuine feeling
of compassion with the other. As Hume states: “Nothing can be more real, or
concern us more than our own sentiments of pleasure and uneasiness" (SelbyBigge, L.A. ed., David Hume - A Treatise of Human Nature 2nd ed, New York:
Oxford University Press, 1978).26
The IMD extends this notion of sympathy to all living things, human, plant
and animal; for just as we act out of sympathy for humans in need, the IMD
claims that we can act out of sympathy when a tree, mountain, lake or ocean is
in need, or when a steer, mink or fish is in need, or when any member of the
biosphere is in need. Human sympathy is often extended to non-humans
primarily because we see another life form in pain and w e simply want to help. In
nearly the same way, human could feel if an ox or horse were in pain, or if a
river was not in its natural state of purity.
Specifically, if we consider the inherent needs of the seal mentioned
earlier in this chapter, w e could begin to feel the pain and suffering of the seal
entangled in the plastic rings . Such sympathy could motivate us to redirect our
actions so that such needless suffering is avoided.
Hume offers a theory of morality which does not depend on a faculty of

2 6 All subsequent references to this w ork will be cited parenthetically.
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reasoning to appreciate moral percepts. He claims that we do not make moral
judgments and perform moral acts on the basis of having arrived at them
intellectually. Instead, we make these judgments and perform moral acts on the
basis of sympathy or moral sentiment. W e judge acts to be wrong because we
feel them to be wrong and only then develop how to start thinking it wrong.
Hume claims:
In whichever way you take it, you find only certain passions,
motives, volitions and thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in
the case. You never can find it, till you turn your reflexion into your
own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in
you, toward this action. Here is a matter of fact; but it is the object
of feeling not of reason. It lies in yourself, not the object (Hume,
Treatise, Book III, Part I, Section I, p. 469. (emphasis added)
Although Hume considered primarily the feelings of humans towards other
humans, IMD argues that these same Humian principles may apply to most, if
not all, members of the biosphere. And since Hume claims his is an argument for
sympathy as a universal sentim ent, it is perhaps better realized within the
confines of the IMD paradigm, where inherent needs such as sympathetic
treatment to all members of the biosphere can be administered.
Furthermore, Hume claims that a true understanding of morality must
recognize humanity and friendship, which cannot include just human interests.
As Hume states: "some particle of the dove [is] kneaded into our nature, along
with elements of the wolf and serpent” (Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the
Principles of Morals, footnote to Section V, Part II, p. 219). In this passage,
Hume seems to be arguing that true sympathy is fulfilled not only through human
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interactions but by realization of a sense of what humans are; a blend of
countless parts of the

b io s p h e r e .2 7

As such we need to develop a sympathetic

attitude towards all members of the biosphere, perhaps by not seeing ourselves
as superior to other life forms, but viewing ourselves as part of a whole. It is
necessary to do so in order to be fully aware of what it means to be human.
Moreover, Hume claims that individual human life is fulfilled only amid the
well-being of society as a whole. Again, IMD would approve but expand the
concept that individual human life is fulfilled only amid the well-being of the
biosphere as a whole, rather than just human-society. The virtues that we
promote, according to Hume, must benefit and be useful to other persons, as
well as ourselves. Thus the adage “do unto others as you would have them do
unto you” would be deemed a truth by Hume. Similarly, IMD argues that the
virtues we promote must benefit and be useful to all members of the biosphere;
that is, we should do unto the biosphere as we would like the biosphere to do
unto us, which would include preserving life itself. It is from this perspective that
IMD seeks to influence policy making.
It is important to emphasize a primary concept of Hume’s philosophy: the
concept of a human being, as that of a creature of feeling. By feeling or
sentiment Hume is referring to the capacity humans possess to feel genuinely
another's condition or situation. In fact, it is from the sharing of the moral
sentiments that family, friendship and community bonds are formed. Humans
have an innate sense of sympathy that they need to tap into when necessary. It
27 it is interesting to note that Darwin w as from the s a m e town as Hum e, which m a y account for the
obvious resem blance this point has to Darw in’s fam ous theories of evolution.
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is from this perspective IMD argues its position. Hume’s element of sympathy
can logically be extended to include all members of the biosphere and that is
exactly the ethical position IMD is defending.
Principle Three claims that all forms of life are part of a larger whole:
members of an integral part of the biosphere that are in some way dependent on
one another for survival. This premise is, in part, based on Aldo Leopold’s
community concept, which claims that the individual is a member of a community
of interdependent parts, where the individual must consider herself as a part of
the land and not an entity apart from it.
The IMD builds on Leopold’s idea claiming that this web of existence is
not only interdependent, but that all in this web of life are in some way
dependent on one another for survival. As support of this, Leopold’s land
pyramid is referenced. Recall how this land pyramid functions: plants absorb
energy from the sun, which flows through a circuit called the biota, which may be
represented by a pyramid consisting of layers. The bottom layer is the soil. A
plant layer rests on the soil, an insect layer on the plants, a bird and rodent layer
on the insects, and so on through various animal groups to the top layer, which
consists of the large carnivores.
W hile it is true that a pyramid does not necessarily illustrate
interdependence because the top layers are not depending, per se, on lower
layers, the idea of life being linked is established by Leopold’s pyramid. Here we
see the complexity of life, in that its functioning depends at least on the
cooperation and competition of its diverse parts. Thus it is dependent on other
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life forms, as this premise of IMD claims. Leopold’s claim is apropos and
summarizes this third premise well:

Men are only fellow-voyagers with other creatures in the odyssey of
evolution (Leopold, 194).

Evaluation o f the Interdependent Morality Directive

I will now critically examine all three principles of the IMD argument,
beginning with the first principle:

PRINCIPLE ONE: All life forms have an inherent worth and as such
are never to be treated as mere objects of intent, i.e. things existing
merely for others.

In principle 1, the IMD claims that all living things possess an inherent
worth that is permanently fixed. Yet how practical is this? Even if we assume that
all living things do have inherent worth, would this significantly affect their
treatment? In a capitalist system such as the United States where a living thing’s
utility is paramount, one’s usefulness to others is a major factor when
considering one’s worth. For instance, a cow’s usefulness is mainly determined
by its production of milk; a steer, its flesh; a tree, its wood; a mink, its fur; and
land, its fertility. So the idea of inherent worth may be nothing more than a noble
and gratuitous gesture of respect lacking genuine reverence for a living thing’s
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worth. This seems to be a rather plausible possibility since many grandiose
ideas claiming justice and equality often fall short of their goals. Since many life
forms have no other worth than a monetary one, it is unlikely that all life forms
will not be treated as objects of intent.

PRINCIPLE 2: All human animals have the capacity to realize and
develop a true sense o f compassion towards most members of the
biosphere.

In this second principle, there is a major problem: how is it possible for a
human being to develop a sense of compassion with most members of the
biosphere? This premise suggests that a human being can somehow feel the
needs of a tree, an insect, or a horse. How conceivable is this? And how would
such a thing be verified? The IMD relies on the sentimental notions of Aldo
Leopold and Paul Taylor, claiming that as humans we are a part of nature, so we
have the capacity to feel as other members of our family feel. Furthermore, the
IMD cites David Hume’s notion of sympathy, arguing that the sympathy that
moves human to help other humans in need can somehow be extended to
nonhumans. This is, at best, a dubious assertion; for Hume’s entire notion of
sympathy is based on human emotions and not those of a tree or horse.
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PRINCIPLE 3: As human beings we lack perfect knowledge about
the relative importance o f each life form and we should, therefore,
treat all life forms as part of a larger whole; that is as members of
an integral part of the biosphere that are in some way dependent
on one another for survival.

Finally, the third principle of the IMD claims that all life forms are part of a
larger whole, all are members of an integral part of the biosphere and all are
completely dependent on one another for survival. The basis of this principle is
found in Leopold’s community concept, which is a part of his land ethic and land
pyramid, both discussed in Chapter 3. Leopold’s community concept states that
the individual is a member of a community of interdependent parts. In relation to
the land, the individual should consider himself a part of the land and not an
entity apart from it. The land pyramid illustrates how the web of interdependence
is created, showing how the complex systems of varied life forms, including
human beings, depend on one another for survival. Both of these concepts
apply mainly to human’s relationship to the environment. In contrast, IMD seeks
to extend these ideas to all members of the biosphere. Thus, IMD argues that all
members of the biosphere are part of the same whole and therefore any conduct
towards an individual member of the biosphere needs to be executed with this
notion of interdependence in mind.
The rationality of this claim is questionable, especially when stating that
all life forms are entirely dependent on one another. The truthfulness of this
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claim is especially dubious when one considers that many life forms exist that
are not entirely dependent on anything. Plant life, for instance, is not especially
dependent on human beings; they need CO 2 , but not ours. It does not depend
on human beings for survival, nor do the myriad of other life forms on this planet,
such as marine animals, most mammals, reptiles, amphibians. Most of these life
forms are more resourceful in relation to humans. So the claim that all life forms
are interdependent is inconclusive. Thus, it seems that human beings who are
more or less the closest to self-sufficiency or independent, w e are the exact
opposite; that is, of all life forms we, as human beings, are far more dependent
and interdependent on the middle and lower life forms of Leopold’s pyramid than
those levels are on us. So, if anything, the IMD is more needed by us, as
humans, than by them, as non-humans.
Thus, it seems odd that the IMD selects Leopold’s land pyramid as a
model of interdependence. In a pyramid, the top level depends on middle and
bottom levels, yet the bottom level doesn't depend on the middle or top layer.
So, the claim that life forms are interdependent as illustrated by the land pyramid
is inconclusive.
All in all the IMD is somewhat short-sighted. It seems to be a romanticized
attempt to reconcile a debate between two factions that are by definition
diametrically opposed. The environmentalist places the land at a higher priority
level than animal rightists. Environmentalists are not preoccupied with the
individual. Animal rightists, in contrast, start with the individual, yet the IMD
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carefully avoids this snare, attempting to gloss over almost with an enchantment
like principle singing praise to some ephemeral sense of unity and togetherness.
Unfortunately, the real world involves individuals who are not willing to give up
their sense of right and wrong so easily and the appeal to this is the IM D’s
biggest shortcoming. In short, it can’t work without a drastic change in the way
the entire world thinks.
Y e t , since the IMD seeks to extend both the animal rights position and
the environmental position by focusing on (1) respect, (2) compassion, and most
important, (3) an awareness and recognition of interdependence among all
members of the biosphere, it is not necessary for both schools of thought to
concur in the IMD paradigm. This seems a sound enough basis for a better
approach to policy making than either the animal rights or the environmental
ethic, since the IMD is based on factors that largely encompass, and more or
less supersede both positions. From this perspective, it offers a strong ethical
foundation. The incorporation of such an ethic into the policy arena is the focus
of the next chapter.

CHAPTER 5
PUTTING THE IMD INTO ACTION
The Interdependent Morality Directive (IMD) as a Working Policy Plan Within
the Interpretive Policy Approach

The incorporation of the IMD paradigm into the policy arena is best made
under the auspices of the Interpretive Policy Approach (IPA) to policy making.
This section of the thesis will focus on the issue of how IMD can become a
legitimate and pragmatic tool for policy making within the IPA paradigm. I begin
with an in-depth examination of the IPA and then relate it to the Interdependent
Morality Directive.
The Interpretive Policy Analysis Approach

According to Rosemary Tong, a leading researcher and writer in the area
of policy analysis and policy formation, IPA argues that the policy world is
populated neither by pure facts nor pure values, but by value laden facts. In
other words there is no clear-cut division of fact and value. There can never be
a factual claim that is totally independent from any value. Facts are selected by
values because human interests determine what counts as a relevant fact (Tong,
Rosemarie, Ethics in Policy Analysis, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice Hall, Inc.,
1987,33)28
IPA is defined as a type of policy analysis emphasizing the
2 8 All subsequent references to this w ork will be cited parenthetically.
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meaningfulness of human action (Callahan, Daniel and Bruce Jennings, Ethics,
The Social Sciences, and Policy Analysis, New York, NY, Plenum Press. 1983,
84). The explanations of human activity offered by IPA are designed to mirror
the purposive, intentional character of the practical reasoning of agents
involved. IPA attempts make sense of it in the same way that the actual
participating agents already made sense of it themselves, or could have done (at
least in principle). Therefore, it offers a valuable method of creating policy
because it considers human beings as active subjects rather than merely as
behaving objects. It thus avoids two problems: (a) treating agents as mere
objects; and (b) the false elitism of policy makers detached from those most
affected by policy decisions. Thus the general aim of IPA is to enable us to
understand events as though we, as policy makers, were looking through the
eyes of those who will be most impacted by the policy decisions. While this
definition of IPA applies most directly to human animals, IMD extends it by
applying it to all members of the biosphere.
One of the fundamental concepts of IPA is that there is no division of fact
and value. The policy world is populated neither by pure facts nor pure values,
but by value-laden facts. It is impossible, therefore, to have factual claims totally
segregated from values.
Jurgen Habermas, a leading proponent of the IPA philosophy, argues that
facts are selected by human

v a lu e s 2 9

t which are motivated by three basic types

of fundamental interests: (1) an interest in controlling the natural environment to

29Human interests determine what counts as a relevant fact.
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facilitate survival; (2) an interest in communication, that is, mutual understanding
and joint enterprise in a context of social traditions; and (3) an interest in
emancipation; that is an interest in becoming free of ideological mystification and
enslaving social constraints. These three interests, according to Habermas,
rigidly guide the process of inquiry by which data, or facts, are collected. There
are three corresponding forms of knowledge: (1) the empirical-analysis sciences;
(2) the historical-hermeneutical sciences; and (3) the critical sciences, such as
psychoanalysis. Habermas claims, for example, that if humans had not been
interested in controlling nature, the natural sciences as we know them today
would be virtually nonexistent. For instance, scientists discovered atoms
because they were looking for them. Discoveries of new facts are only made
because individuals are looking for particular answers to specific questions that
researchers and scientists deem important for one reason or another. The basic
vehicle of these ideas is found in the policy postures of the IPS philosophy.
Accordingly, w e’ll now examine the IPA in detail.
As a policy framework, the IPA has three fundamental principles. First, as
stated earlier, interpretive policy science categorically claims that facts are
neither docile nor neutral. Habermas claims that facts are all unruly (essentially
contestable) and value-laden (interpreted). So the question raised by IPA is not
whether the facts are relevant to empirical analysis; instead IPA asks what kinds
of facts are selected and how they are to be interpreted (Tong, 24). A second
fundamental principle of IPA is that success with the IPA paradigm largely
depends on the insight and creativity of the analyst herself. The interpretive
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policy scientist is not content just to study the mere facts that x did y and under
what conditions x is likely to do y again. Rather, she wants to know why x
decided to do y and how y is related to the past activities of x. Thus the
interpretive policy scientist aims to explain human activities, social relationships
and cultural artifacts in terms of an agent's reasons for doing actions,
establishing a relationship, or making an artifact. In turn, these reasons are
explained in terms of the context of conventions, rules, and norms within which
they are formed. The interpretive policy scientist “spins a web in an attempt to
explain the meaning of a given activity, relationship, or artifact in an everwidening web of interrelated activities, relationships, or artifacts” (Tong, 36). The
third fundamental concept is that IPA is a “rhetorical and persuasive medium.
Facts do not speak for themselves. The interpretive analyst must speak on their
behalf ” (Tong, 36). So there are no cold, hard facts that need not be interpreted;
each fact must be interpreted in accordance with specific criterion of the policy
issue at hand.
So the IPA is almost exclusively a subjective approach to policy analysis.
It is the opposite of a logical positivistic approach where objective interpretation
of facts is necessary. Policy analysts from the logical-positivist school of thought
view themselves as technicians and scientists, guarding against any subjective
interpretation of the issues at hand.
It is from the IPA that the IMD paradigm will have the greatest impact in
policy making. IPA serves as a natural foundation for the IMD paradigm. This is
true for several reasons. First, since IMD agues that all life forms have an
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inherent worth and as such are never to be treated as mere objects. A policy
analyst in the environmental arena, for instance, would need to adopt an
interpretive posture to her area of policy formation, since the biosphere has such
an enormous diversity of life forms. Also, IMD argues that as human beings we
lack perfect knowledge about the relative importance of each life form and we
should, therefore, treat all life forms as part of a larger whole; that is, as
members of an integral part of the biosphere that are in some way dependent on
one another for survival.
So, by speaking on behalf of the facts, the interpretive policy analyst
would not allow facts to speak for themselves. The analyst would, therefore, be
an indispensable part of the IMD policy process; for she would be the creative
link between the biosphere and the policy itself. Hence more life forms could be
heard by having an interpretive policy analyst speak on their behalf.

The Practicality of the Interdependent Morality Directive in the Policy Process

W hen considering policy issues from a standpoint which integrates both
environmental issues and animal rights issues, the environmental movement has
exceeded the the animal rights/animal welfare movement. This is evidenced by
examining key legislation advanced by powerful environmental groups that have
consistently and effectively penetrated policy areas. These environmental
groups have a clear and well formulated understanding of the goals of the
environmental movement, as evidenced by the popular Endangered Species
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Act. It is primarily because of this factor that their successes have been so
prevalent. Groups such as the National Resources Defense Council, the
Environmental Defense Fund, the National Wildlife Federation, National
Audubon Society, Friends of the Earth and the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund
are just a few of the national public interest law groups that commit themselves
to monitor, negotiate, litigate, and lobby many rigorous, enforceable regulatory
programs that impact policy making at the environmental level. The critical role
these organizations have played in securing environmental protection is
impressive. Yet the animal rights factor still seems to be missing.
Similarly, the animal rights groups ignore the environmental issue . This
lack of harmony between animal rightists and environmentalists results in
disorganized and ineffective policies and legislation. A survey of some of the
most recent legislation for animal rights illustrates the insidious effect such
disorganization has on subsequent policy making. The legislation that is passed
is often ineffective and vague in that it addresses only animal rights instead of
both environmental and animal rights issues. The IMD will be shown to be a
viable tool in reconciling these policy making problems. This is best seen by
analyzing several key policies of the environmental and animal rights groups
which will set the stage to show how the IMD paradigm may be employed to
resolve some of the conflicts that often surface when these two factions meet in
the policy-making arena.
The Animal W elfare Act (USC Sec. 2131 et. seq; passed 1966, amended
1970 and 1976) established several regulation systems to protect dogs, cats,
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and many species of wild animals from abuse (Cooper, Margaret E, Introduction
to Animal Law, A/ewYork, NY, Academic Press, 1987, 79)30 . Birds, reptiles,
rodents, and farm animals, however, are not covered by this legislation, nor are
scientific research laboratories. The environmental issue is completely
neglected.
The Act deals with interstate movement and commercial dealing involving
various species of animals. It forbids animal fights (although game bird fights are
outlawed only where state laws have that effect). It also regulates that supply
and care of animals destined for research facilities or exhibition in the pet trade.
The 1966 Act has been further amended by the Improvement Standards for
Laboratory Animals Act 1985 which requires the establishment of institutional
animal committees and the provision by USDA of standards for the care of
animals used in research.
The Act controls the supply and care of animals (defined as cats, dogs,
nonhuman primates, rabbits, hamsters and guinea pigs) destined for, and kept
in, research facilities. The Act does not apply to rats and mice, although these
and other warm-blooded species could be designated as subject to the Act.
“Facilities must obtain their animals from licensed dealers and mark such cats
and dogs and keep records accordingly” (Cooper, 174). The Act expressly does
not apply to the design and performance of experiments using animals. Any
procedures that would protect animals from unnecessary research and/or
infliction of pain are not mandatory under the Act. The protection of such animals

30 All subsequent references to this w ork will be cited parenthetically.
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and the regulation of experimental procedures are dependent, not on any
legislative provisions, but on various administrative structures, inspection and
financial control by grant-giving agencies. The Act merely states that research
facilities must meet certain standards in the care, treatment and use of animals,
yet no specific guidelines are offered. The Act does require that all research
facilities must be registered with the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) and
an annual report stating animal usage must be submitted. However, the roles
and competency of such quasi-judicial bodies such as the USDA is
questionable, especially since the regulations are often written using ambiguous
and vague terminology.
Various offices are involved in certifying that the minimal standards of the
Act are met, including the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the American
Association for Accreditation of Laboratory Animal Care (AAALAC); yet even if
the minimal standards set by the Act were, in fact, achieved, animal "welfare"
would not be the result, mostly because of the inherent shortsightedness of such
policies. The Act fails to consider crucial factors that may play vital roles in its
implementation, such as environmental issues, as well as political and economic
forces.
If animal rights groups had employed the help of environmental groups,
better, more suitable legislation could have resulted. There is no specific
provision in this act protecting animals from abuse, neglect, or any other
exploitation. There are merely vague references to these issue, but nothing
devoted exclusively to animal welfare, as the title of the act leads one to believe.
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Unfortunately, the pattern seen in the Animal W elfare Act is not atypical
of animal rights/welfare policy. Consider the title of the next piece of legislation:
The Humane Slaughter Act (something of an oxymoron) of 1958 (as amended
1978). This legislation is a feeble attempt to appear to offer humane treatment of
animals. It requires livestock (cattle, calves, horses, mules, sheep, swine) to be
slaughtered by specified methods, including ritual slaughter (Cooper, 171).
While the intent of the act seems clear enough, much is left unsaid. For
instance, is it even feasible to humanely slaughter an animal? Is it necessary to
slaughter animals in the first place? Are the needs of the animals considered?
These issues are never addressed, nor are the issues of the relevance of
environmental factors.
In the same way, The Horse Protection Act 1970 ( as amended 1976) and
the Wild Horse and Burros Act 1971 (as amended 1978) provide so-called
protection from various forms of cruelty and the capture and killing of wild horses
which live on federally owned public land (Cooper, 88). However, there is no
mention as to the allotment of management and/or enforcement of this act. While
the federal government claims that there are rangers who strive to uphold this
legislation, local offices are usually severely understaffed and ill-equipped to
make a substantial difference.
Furthermore, The Lacey Act 1901 ( as amended 1948, 1949, 1960,1969)
prohibits the interstate transport of wildlife which has been killed in violation of
state laws (Cooper, 101). Once again, legal loopholes encouraged by the vague
language of the Act allow gross legal violations.
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The common denominator in all these pieces of animal welfare legislation
is twofold: (1) the use of inadequate language; and (2) the disregard of any
environmental issues. There are no specific sections in any of the
aforementioned pieces of legislation that specifically and realistically direct
humans to take the needs of nonhuman animals seriously. The crucial role the
environment itself plays in the welfare of animals is sorely lacking in almost all of
the aforementioned pieces of legislation. The result is that half of the problem is
addressed; the animal problem. But the animal’s vital link to the environment is
left alone, as if it were inconsequential.
The environmental movement has made strides towards realization of its
goals. Yet the animal rights issue often remains unaddressed. For example, the
Endangered Species Act of 1969 (as amended 1973, 1978, 1993) deals with
national and international commerce in the species as listed by the US
Department of the Interior as endangered or threatened as well as with their
protection from hunting, killing, taking, and injuring. Protection is afforded to their
habitat in those areas vital to their survival, yet the protection species itself is
often the prime focus of this legislation, and as a result a utilitarian ethic is often
imposed.
The Endangered Species Act was originally designed to protect those
species of plants and animals that are endangered or threatened with extinction
over all or a significant portion of their habitats (Rohlf, Daniel, The Endangered
Species Act, Stanford, CA, Stanford Environmental Law Society, 1989,
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However, several sections of the Act were seriously thwarted by a 1978
amendment which established a cabinet-level committee. Its sole purpose was to
manage the resolution of conflicts between endangered species and federal
projects such as dams, federal housing, and military installations. This 7member committee had virtually unlimited power and discretion when
endangered species posed a problem with a federal project. So, it could, and
often did, order the extinction of any species in favor of a development project.
This committee was the result of short-sighted policy makers unaware of the
whole environmental problem. There were no consultations with animal rights
groups, nor was there any investigation of the long-range implications of such
policies.
Furthermore, The Endangered Species Act lists thousands of species in
danger of extinction, yet “most of the species in danger of extinction will wait
years, perhaps decades more before they are listed and protected under the
Act...For species already listed, the nominal protection afforded...may be all that
species receives." (Rohlf, 5). Why? Primarily due to the lack of cooperation and
exchange of information between animal rights and environmental groups. If the
IMD could be implemented and its ideas of inherent equality put into practice,
such delays might be avoided.
Yet how exactly will the IMD be put into effect? The next chapter deals
with this issue.

CHAPTER 6
IMPLEMENTATION OF IMD
The Interdependent Morality Directive and three stages o f the policy process:
agenda setting, decision making, implementation

This section will analyze how IMD might be incorporated into the policy
process. By examining three central stages of the policy process - agenda
setting, decision making, and implementation - the practicality of the IMD will be
revealed. In brief, the IMD could serve a as guideline for policy makers in an
attempt to bring some semblance of orderliness to a world that is often teeming
with chaos; for Heineman claims that “the whole policy process is messy, replete
with considerable randomness, but careful research can have an important
impact-from agenda setting through the implementation stage" (Heineman, The
World of the Policy Analyst-Rationality, Values, and Politics, Chatham, NJ,
Chatham House Publishing, Inc., 5)32.
In terms of the practical use of IMD in the policy process, the policy
analyst plays such a critical role that to truly understand policy making,
Heineman argues, one must understand the policy-maker’s values. As a guide
for a policy analyst, IMD offers a holistic set of values because it considers the
welfare and interests of all members of the biosphere. Thus, IMD could

32 All subsequent references to this work will be cited parenthetically.
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conceivably play a significant role in maintaining an element of fairness in the
policy process.
To be understood properly, policy analysis must be examined within the
larger policy process. Three of these steps - agenda setting, decision making ,
and implementation are critical to the policy analyst and will now be analyzed.

Agenda Setting - Stage 1

In the policy process, a proposal needs to be set on an official agenda, if
it is to be seriously considered. There must be a problem to be dealt with that
requires interaction on some official policy level, otherwise the problem will not
be considered to be a legitimate concern. According to Heineman, there are
three basic elements that help to shape what gets on the governmental agenda:
(1) problems, (2) politics, and (3) visible participants.
First, a condition must be identified as a problem before it will be put on
the agenda. Getting officials to believe that there is a problem is one key step in
agenda setting, and at this point analysts can have significant influence by
providing data and carefully framing the dimensions of the problem. Second,
there are political factors that affect agenda setting. A kind of consensus may
emerge that certain circumstances call for governmental consideration; this
consensus is often a product of bargaining, negotiation, and compromise among
a multitude of actors. Political factors are very often crucial in determining what
problems are seen as serious and which ones are not. A political climate may
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exist that may or may not favor a particular issue in need of being resolved, yet
careful attention by a diligent policy analyst may enable certain issues to be
presented from a new perspective. Recall that IMD may provide the necessary
impetus to link essential coalitions together. By realizing the value of a policy
directive such as IMD, an agreement may be reached that could bridge the
political barriers and special interests that prevent progress. The third and most
important element that shapes what items are placed on the governmental
agenda is visible political actors. “If any one set of participants in the policy
process is important in the shaping of agenda, it is elected officials and their
appointees rather than career bureaucrats or nongovernmental actors”
(Kingdon, John W., Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies Boston, Little,
Brown and Co., 1984,

20

).33 Visible political actors are central in deciding what

to decide about. These include the President, Congress, key-level appointees,
top administrators, the media, government parties, and interest groups. If few or
none of the visible actors is in favor of placing a problem on the agenda, it is
highly unlikely that it will be considered.34 Perhaps the most substantial of all
these actors is the president him self, as compared to other political actors.
According to John Kingdon, “When a president sends up a bill, it takes first
place in the queue. All other bills take second place. No other single actor in the
political system has quite the capability of the president to set agendas in govern
policy areas for all who deal with those policies “ (Kingdon, 25).

33 All subsequent references to this w ork will be cited parenthetically.
34 S o political actors would need to a g re e on the inherent value of all living things and act in accordance
with the ideas espoused by the IM D
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These three elements represent the basic, common regularities in the
process by which problems are placed on an agenda. But according to
Heineman, the foremost factors that impact which items get placed on the
agenda are values, such as equity or the redress of imbalances or unfairness.
Proposals can get onto the agenda if an existing policy is seen as unfair, even if
other proposed remedies are more inefficient. Equity is such a significant value
in the policy-making arena that it may override policy analysis based on
efficiency criteria, since most policy makers cite justice as a leading priority in
their work.
It is with this value of equity that the IMD is probably best associated. One
of the chief goals of the IMD is to construct a foundation from which more just
policies can be created. The IMD and its main principles of inherent necessities
and equality serve to help foster equity when dealing with members of the
biosphere in policy issues.
So for an issue to be deemed serious, it must possess the following: (1)
be a legitimate problem having significance relative to society; and (2) not fall
victim to obscure political forces but rather be a product of collective action
where the welfare of all those involved be seriously considered.

Decision-Making -

Stage 2

The second stage of the policy process focuses on making decisions. At
this point, there must be at least some budgetary support for it. It is at this stage
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that most of the majority coalitions already formed come into play; that is, a
process of negotiation and compromise takes place among involved parties.
According to Heineman, the decision-making stage is often inundated by
unknown factors that may impact policy making, such as money constraints,
confusing or misleading terminology, time limits, as well as other variables.
Because there are often so many unknown variables, policy makers may, at
times, employ a heuristic device or rule-of-thumb, such as “Red sky in morning,
sailor take warning” or “A stitch in time saves nine.” Heuristics are often utilized
when a decision is needed, yet all necessary factors are not known. So when
facts are not clear and the context in which decisions are to be made is murky,
irrational shortcuts are utilized in order to facilitate decision making.
It seems that the IMD could be utilized effectively at this decision-making
stage of the policy process. This is not to imply that the IMD is merely a heuristic
device, but by incorporating it as a standard by which to evaluate proposals,
decisions can be made with greater consideration for all members of the
biosphere.
The practicality of the IMD becomes apparent when one considers
Heineman’s two main perceptions about decision-making: (1) values and
decision-making shortcuts used by policy makers play a large role in determining
the choices made under conditions of uncertainty; and
(2) human being’s tendency to interpret uncertain facts to comport with their
values and beliefs; their preconceptions shape the types of information used in
decision making (Heineman, 60).
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The first of Heineman’s claims seems to suggest that the heuristic devices
aforementioned are key factors in the decision-making process. The IMD could
virtually rule-out resorting to such arbitrary methods. The IMD would be the
standard that could replace the heuristic device in matters involving animal and
environmental issues.
For instance, recall that the IMD argues that correct conduct toward any
member of the biosphere is that which fosters conditions that are at least
necessary, if not sufficient, for its continued existence in a natural state. Such a
directive would not allow any policy plan to be initiated that would violate this
guideline. So, hypothetically, if there was a policy proposal that could alleviate
hunger in a section of the U.S., yet thousands of acres of prime forest and
wildlife needed to be destroyed to reach such a goal, then the IMD could be
implemented and necessitate exploring other possibilities.
Heineman’s second comment regarding preconceptions indicates that a
policy-maker’s biases may distort the decision-making process. The IMD might
serve to regulate the biases of a certain policy maker, thereby allowing a more
representative decision to be made. Policy analysts, for instance, are often
trained in varying ways, such as a logical-positivistic approach versus an
interpretive approach. These different approaches to policy making often come
in conflict with one another. The IMD could feasibly bridge the gap between
opposing schools of thought, since it is a to be a generic guideline which
transcends any given ideology. In such a way, the IMD would not tolerate other
values. A logical-positivist, for example, might consider a policy proposal that
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could alleviate hunger in a section of the U.S., yet thousands of acres of prime
forest and wildlife needed to be destroyed to reach such a goal perfectly
acceptable, if he bases his decision on facts alone. A policy-maker schooled in
the interpretive mode, might consider a policy absurd. Yet both analysts would
need to remember as well as incorporate the IMD into the policy itself. Hence,
personal bias would be limited.
So the decision-making stage of the policy process is of special
importance. It is at this stage where the IMD may have special usefulness.

Implementation - - Stage 3

The third and final stage of the policy process is where a policy is realized
and imposed. It is at this stage that policy becomes a living part of society, where
official agencies are empowered to supervise and police certain policy
provisions, assuring that the policy is more than just a useless paper-document
with no real power to govern policy decisions. According to Heineman, there are
several key players at this stage, including interests groups, judges, and
administrators in the agencies charged with putting a paper policy into operation.
It is at this stage that the IMD could play a significant part. According to
Heineman, the major contribution of policy analysts to the implementation stage
occurs at the policy formulation stage. At that stage, policy analysts can have an
impact on program administration by having the foresight to build into their
analyses specifications that increase the odds of successful implementation
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later. The IMD could serve as a precept for policy-maker’s values at the policy
formulation stage, thereby limiting any potentially problematic policy provisions.
Consequently, the implementation of a specific policy would need to be in
compliance with the IMD. For instance, if a particular policy w ere proposed for
the treatment of sewage waste in an area densely populated by wildlife, the main
IMD guideline of inherent worth could be implemented in an effort to protect the
wildlife. The impact on the lives of nonhuman animals and the land would need
to be considered as a vital policy issue prior to implementation, as opposed to
such issues being considered after the policy had been implemented.
In the United States, public policy is implemented primarily by a complex
system of administrative agencies (Anderson, 99). The effectiveness of these
agencies will be affected by two elements: (1) the political context in which it
operates; and (2) the amount of political support it has. Thus, politics has a great
impact on how an agency exercises its discretion and carries out its programs.
The IMD could possibly curtail at least some of the political forces at play, since
it prohibits certain actions.
Specifically, the forces at work are mainly composed of the following: (1)
the Chief Executive, (2) the Congressional System of Supervision, (3) the
Courts, and (4) other administrative agencies. The chief executive controls
agencies that either are located in the Presidential chain of command or are
otherwise subject to Presidential control and direction. The Congressional
System of Supervision includes any standing committees and subcommittees
thereof, committee staffs, committee chairman, and influential congressmen.
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Congressional influence is fragmented and sporadic rather than monolithic and
continuous. It emanates from parts of Congress, rarely from Congress as a
whole. The courts affect agencies by their use of judicial review and statutory
interpretation. Other administrative agencies may exert influence on each other,
such as the Department of Agriculture does on the ICC in agricultural cases. As
a result, there are a number of agencies that operate on other agencies by
pushing and pulling against each other.
In an attempt to somewhat command all these forces, the IMD may play a
vital part. As a common value shared by the policy makers, the IMD could guide
the personal values that so often play an important role in aiding or hindering
policy implementation. Because administrators often have considerable
discretion in how they implement policy, their attitudes towards a program are
important. The IMD could impact the attitudes of administrators by presenting
itself as a directive to be followed at all stages of the policy process.
As an example of some policy issues that are inundated by conflicting
agencies’ differing ideals, the next chapter focuses more specifically on animal
rights and environmental policy/legislation, showing the progress of each group.

CHAPTER 7
REALIZATION OF THE IM D
The IM D and the State of the World

As a policy directive in the animal rights/environmental ethics debate, the
IMD has consistently argued that there needs to be a set of guidelines striving to
comply with most of the relevant aspects of both factions.
Yet why is the IMD needed? W hy should the environmentalist and the
animal rightist abandon current practices and ideologies? In short, it is because
they are ultimately ineffective. Policy makers on both sides of the animal
rights/environmental ethics debate cannot look at one single global issue in
isolation. Each side can probably correct individual fragments of a global
problem but that fragment will probably deteriorate a moment later because what
it is connected to has been ignored. The IMD wants to be the glue that helps
keep the fragments together and it is possible, considering how the IMD is
structured.
From the animal rights argument, the IMD seeks to extend Regan’s idea
of inherent value to all members of the biosphere, instead of just mammals.
From the environmental argument, the IMD focuses on the relative importance of
each member of the biosphere, claiming that all are part of the same whole.
Ultimately, the IMD argues that it could be the standard that all members of the
biosphere can, quite literally, live with.
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At a practical level, by gradually introducing the the IMD into the
Interpretive School of Policy Analysis (IPA), the beneficial aspects of the IMD
could be realized. The IPA would sustain and nourish the cooperative
component of the Interdependent Morality Directive, thereby allowing a
comprehensive interpretation of the facts and values involved in policy making.
In terms of actually implementing the IMD, w e first need to consider the
current political atmosphere. To do so, we examine the 1995 publication of the
World Watch Institute, State o f the World: 1995. Here we find an article by Hilary
F. French, Forging a New Global Partnership. French discusses the issues of
biodiversity and policy formation, focusing on which political groups are
supporters of environmental protection ethics and which are not.
French reports that there have been measurable gains in the area of
protection for the global environment. For example:
Air pollution in Europe has been reduced dramatically as a result
of the 1979 treaty on transboundary air pollution. Global
chloroflourocarbon (CFC) emmisions have dropped 60% from their
peak in 1988 following the 1987 treaty on ozone depletion and its
subsequent amendments. The killing of elephants has plummeted
because of the 1990 ban on commercial trade in ivory under the
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Flora and Fauna. And mining exploration and development have
been forbidden in Antarctica for 50 years under a 1991 accord
(French, Hilary F. “Forging a New Global Partnership.” In State of
The World:1995, ed. Lester Brown, 179-89. New York, NY:
W orldW atch Institute/W.W. Norton, 1995., 171).35

French notes, however, the current state of the world is far from perfect.
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The Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in June of 1992 marked the first time in
history when the leaders of several nations gathered together to discuss the
state of the planet. The Earth Summit resulted in the adoption of Agenda 21, a
500-page blueprint for sustainable development. If implemented, it would require
far-reaching changes by international agencies, national governments, and
individuals everywhere. Unfortunately, the ideals set forth at the Earth Summit
have had a minimal effect on global ecology. Three years after Rio there is still
vast evidence of global ecological decline:
Carbon dioxide concentrations are mounting in the atmosphere,
species loss continues to accelerate, fisheries are collapsing, land
degradation frustrates efforts to feed hungry people, and the
earth’s forest cover keeps shrinking (French, 171).
In short, the global partnership called for in Rio is failing due to a severe
weakening of political will. Yet there is hope. In July of 1995, the major industrial
powers are devoting their 1995 Economic Summit in Nova Scotia to the
framework of institutions required to ensure sustainable development with good
prosperity and well-being of the peoples of our nations and the world in the
twenty-first century. So there is a very real attempt to create a sense of solidarity
among the peoples of the world. These new partnerships focusing on
international cooperation and coordination are at the forefront and it is with this
sense of cohesion the IMD could be implemented.
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The State of the World and Implications of the IMD

French discusses the possibility of creating a full-fledged environment
agency within the U.N. system. Such an agency could develop basic
environmental principles, perhaps incorporating the IMD paradigm as a
fundamental guideline for policy formation. This would enable the IMD to be an
innate part of the world’s policy-making practices. Such an organization might
consider the far-reaching implications of the IMD, such as: (1) overall cost of
implementation of the IMD; (2) the amount of time needed for effective use of the
IMD in specific policy areas; and (3) any legal ramifications that implementation
of the IMD may have at both the national and international level.
1. Of paramount concern in implementation of the IMD is cost. As
burdened as most countries are, it seems unlikely that many would be willing to
try yet another policy plan that could increase those debts even further. A recent
survey by World Bank shows the external debt of developing countries as
tripling by the year 2,000. Many developing countries paid $160 billion in debtservice payments in 1992. With such huge debts already, the IMD would need to
carefully consider how much financial backing would be needed for agenda
setting , decision making , and implementation. Money would be needed to staff,
organize, police and implement all the ideals the IMD espouses.
2. Time is also a crucial factor when considering the implementation of
the IMD and time is a very precious commodity. At a very basic level, it seems as
though the IMD is slightly ahead of its time; that is, the world, as a whole, is in
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the embryonic stage ethically. Pursuit of power, prestige, and money are the
current directives of many citizens of this planet. It could feasibly take decades,
perhaps centuries, before the full potential of the IMD is realized.
3.

The legal consequences of implementing the IMD could be enormous.

Since the IMD ultimately seeks to be realized at an international level, the
possibilities of legal burdens grows considerably. How would the IMD interact in
a communist society, such as China? Would there need to be the IMD policeforce to enforce the ideas of the IMD? And if so, where does such a right-ofinternational-interference come from? These are not easy issues to address, yet
they must be resolved or the IMD faces being nothing more than the product of
an idealistic-bygone era.
The true meaning of the IMD, therefore, can only be realized and
implemented into real policy if a change in the idea of a community is adopted.
Robert Welborn, Professor of Environmental Studies at Franktown,
Colorado, claims that there must be a community o f interest, if the planet is to
survive. According to Welborn:
If the human species is to save the life and beauty of this planet
from the ravages of its own domination and degradation, we must
recognize, develop and act upon a community of interests and
aspirations founded upon a respect for all life and for the
substances and processes of Nature (Robert Welborn, A
Community of Interest, in Between the Species. Vol. 8, 4. p. 234).
The IMD would incorporate such perceptions into the policy arena.
Furthermore, Welborn claims that by adopting a community of interest, all
life forms will benefit. When all elements of life are community, Welborn argues,
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then the sensitivities and intelligences which bring people to a concern for the
environment are the sensitivities and intelligences which bring people to a
concern for animal welfare.
There must be a worldwide community where the actions of all nations
are considered in terms of their impact on other nations.
There is no longer time for human endeavors to develop and
operate in isolation. There is no longer time for a person to be just
a lawyer, just a farmer, or just an educator...Isolation of the human
species within itself and fron communion with the world community
of living things has brought this world, its life and beauty, to the
brink of extinction (Welborn, 235).
The IMD would encourage such attitudes. By emphasizing the
interdependence of all life forms and by categorically rejecting the assumption
that only human life is important and that all other life can be exploited and
abused, the IMD could give birth to many policies that encourage a worldwide
community of interest.
By focusing on the essence of the IMD, the animal rightist’s and
environmentalist’s argument begin to be reconciled. The gist of the IMD,
however, seeks to greatly extend both these camps so that the interdependence
of all members of the biosphere is supported, nurtured and used as a basis for
policy decisions. From Tom Regan’s animal rights argument, the IMD retains the
view that the infliction of unjustifiable suffering on other animals is not
acceptable. Regan’s primary target in his argument is mammals. The IMD
extends this notion by including non-mammals in the sphere of moral concern.
From Aldo Leopold’s and Paul Taylor’s arguments, the dominate characteristic is
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a holistic philosophy concerned primarily with the land itself. Both Leopold and
Taylor focus on the interdependence of all life forms, arguing that the welfare of
the land itself is directly linked to the welfare of human and non-human animals.
The IMD extends this argument claiming that the philosophies of Leopold and
Taylor need to be incorporated into a larger paradigm, w here the connection
with Hume between land and animal is seen and felt as a real connection, a
straightforward interdependence shared by all members of the biosphere.
The philosophy of the IMD is clear: all members of the biosphere are
interdependent and this bond needs to be nurtured. Only then will all animals
and all lands be respected for what they truly are: members of one biosphere;
one life; one Earth.
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